From the Author

REFLECTIONS

AT

THE CONCLUSION

OF

THE WAR:

BEING A SEQUEL TO

"REFLECTIONS

ON THE POLITICAL AND MORAL STATE OF SOCIETY, AT THE CLOSE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY."

BY JOHN BOWLES, ESQ.

"Through what new ſcenes and changes muſt we paſs?
The wide, th' unbounded proſpect lies before me,
But ſhadows, clouds, and darkneſs, reſt upon it!
Here will I hold. If there's a Power above,
(And that there is all Nature cries aloud
Through all her works) He muſt delight in virtue,
And that which He delights in muſt be happy."

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR F. AND C. RIVINGTON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD.

SOLD ALSO BY W. AND J. RICHARDSON, ROYAL-EXCHANGE; J. WRIGHT, AND W. HATCHARD, PICCADILLY.

1800.

G. WOODFALL, PRINTER, PATERNOSTER-ROW.

REFLECTIONS, &c.

AT length the event, ſo long and ſo ardently deſired, is arrived. The ſword is ſheathed; the effuſion of blood is ſtopped; the clang of arms is every where exchanged for thoſe joyful acclamations which Peace is ſo well calculated to call forth from nations tired and exhauſted with a long and furious conflict. But when the tranſports which naturally accompany ſuch an event ſhall have ſubſided, very different emotions will ſucceed. It will then be diſcovered, that Peace, in the preſent inſtance, is not productive of that ſentiment of confidence, which on former occaſions, it never failed to inſpire; that it does not convey an idea even of that ordinary ſtability, which, notwithſtanding the claſhing intereſts and diſcordant views of the contracting parties, was formerly its inſeparable attendant—that it does not bring with it that ſenſe of ſecurity, which hitherto has been conſidered as conſtituting

its chief value—that, notwithſtanding all the tranſports of joy which it occaſions, it does not enable us to look towards futurity without dread, or to diveſt the mind of alarm for thoſe intereſts which we moſt value—for our domeſtic quiet, our internal ſafety, our Holy Religion, our laws, our conſtitution; nay, for our very exiſtence as an independent ſtate. In a word, when the paroxyſm of joy, which has been produced by the unexpected arrival of a moſt ardently deſired event ſhall be over, it will be found that the Peace, which is the ſubject of ſo much exultation, is at beſt but a bold and hazardous experiment, which, however it may have been dictated by neceſſity, is ſanctioned by no precedent, either in ancient or modern times; and that, if we eſcape the perils to which we are ſtill expoſed, we ſhall be indebted rather to the extraordinary favour of that Providence, who has hitherto ſmiled ſo graciouſly upon us, than to the ordinary means of ſafety, without which our anceſtors never ventured to lay down their arms.

Let it not be ſuppoſed that reflections like theſe will occur only to ſuch perſons as have been in the habit of deprecating a concluſion of the war, until it might be terminated with honour and ſafety; they will haunt the minds even of thoſe who have been moſt impatient for Peace, and who hail its return with the moſt enthuſiaſtic rapture. Soon as the cup of joy, which ſuch perſons are preparing eagerly to quaff, ſhall have reached their lips, it will be found to contain a mixture of

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of moſt bitter ingredients. A little calm conſideration will convince them that they cannot, without the utmoſt danger, reſign themſelves to that repoſe which they have ſo earneſtly deſired, and for the ſake of which they make ſo many ſacrifices—that at beſt they can only reſt upon their arms—that they muſt not venture to break up their camp, or to diſmiſs their centinels—that the Peace which inſpires them with inexpreſſible ſatisfaction, is attended with more perils than any War in which this country has ever been engaged—and that they muſt continue in a ſtate of watchfulneſs and preparation, which ſeems rather to indicate an armed truce, a mere ceſſation of hoſtilities, than that happy and enviable condition which alone has hitherto been denominated Peace. All this is clearly and neceſſarily implied in that impoſſibility, of which every one is ſenſible, to return with ſafety to a Peace Eſtabliſhment *; and in that indiſpenſable

* The impoſſibility has been recognized as well by the oppoſers as by the friends of Government. In the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament Mr. Tierney is reported, in refutation of ſome financial ſtatements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to have admitted that conſidering the preſent ſituation of Europe, Great Britain could not ſafely return to an ordinary Peace Eſtabliſhment—and that while a Peace would materially diminiſh her reſources, it would not authorize her to reduce, in the accuſtomed manner, her naval armaments. If this be true, as it indiſputably is, how does it accord with the encouragement which the honourable gentleman and his friends have given us, for ſo many years, to conſider a pacification with the French Republic as calculated to produce all the beneficial effects which ordinarily attend a ſtate of peace?

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neceſſity, which is ſo apparent, of adopting unheard of precautions, to preſerve us from the dangers of an intercourſe with that nation, with which we have formed relations of Peace and Amity, and from the pernicious principles by which, ſtill more than by her arms, that nation has made Europe a ſcene of deſolation and woe.

It is natural to enquire what are the cauſes which, in the preſent inſtance, render peace ſo eſſentially different from what it has been on all former occaſions? In vain ſhall we ſeek for an anſwer to this enquiry in the preliminary terms which have been ſigned and mutually ratified. To judge merely from thoſe terms, it ſhould appear that Great Britain, after a long and moſt furious conteſt, has not only retained whatever ſhe poſſeſſed at the commencement of the War, but has acquired, in full ſovereignty, two very valuable ſettlements, which increaſe conſiderably the ſecurity of her former poſſeſſions, and furniſh a great addition to her commercial reſources; that ſhe has thus conſiderably improved the *ſtatus quo*, between herſelf and her enemies; while, actuated by a ſpirit of wiſe and magnanimous moderation, ſhe reſtores to thoſe enemies a number of ſplendid and valuable conqueſts, the retention of which by her would be calculated to excite a ſpirit of jealouſy and diſcontent, extremely unfavourable to the duration of Peace. This, it muſt be admitted, is a conſtruction which the preliminaries of Peace, upon the *face* of them, ſeem fairly to warrant: but he muſt be a ſhort-ſighted politician who is ſatisfied with

with ſo contracted a view of the ſubject. To account for the failure of *ſuch* a Peace to bring with it even a conſciouſneſs of common ſafety, it is neceſſary to refer to the awful, alarming, and unprecedented ſtate of the European Continent. It will then be found that experience has brought with it a dreadful confirmation of a truth that has been often urged, in order to allay that impatience for Peace which was too prevalent in this country; that the general ſecurity of Europe is eſſential to the ſecurity of each individual ſtate, and that it would be impoſſible for Great Britain to enjoy repoſe and ſafety, unleſs the independence of the Continental States, and the Balance of Power were preſerved. By thus viewing the ſubject upon a great ſcale, as involving the independence of all States, and the general intereſts of Society, it becomes intelligible to the meaneſt capacity; the inquietude which embitters the return of peace is eaſily accounted for; nay, the contradictory opinions, which honeſt and even enlightened men expreſs on the occaſion, are clearly explained. If Great Britain be regarded as a ſeparate State, independent on her neighbours, and a mere diſintereſted ſpectator of what paſſes on the Continent (a character which ſhe ſeems to think it in her power to aſſume), then may ſhe be ſatisfied with the terms on which ſhe has concluded the War, and conſider them as ſafe and honourable; but conſidered as a member of that European Community, of which ſhe neceſſarily forms a part, and with which ſhe muſt ultimately ſtand or fall, ſhe

has the greateſt reaſon to be alarmed at the ſituation in which ſhe is left by the Peace, (notwithſtanding the proviſion which has been made by her in favour of her Allies*) and to look forward to the conſequences of that meaſure with the utmoſt apprehenſion and dread. If there be a man who can take up the map of Europe, and contemplate the immenſe territories which are now, either denominated France, or, (which is ſubſtantially the ſame thing) in abſolute ſubjection to her will; if, further, he can take into the account, that the power which on account of its aggrandizement is ſo formidable—ſo terrific—is alſo a Revolutionary Power, a Military Deſpotiſm, not only impelled by inſatiable ambition, but intereſted for its own preſervation, to deſire the overthrow of other States, and likely to be obliged, like Rome, for the ſake of its internal quiet, to purſue that complete ſubjugation of its neighbours, towards which it has already made ſuch prodigious advances—if there be a man who can take all this into conſideration, and keep his breaſt free from alarm, he cannot be compoſed of ordinary materials:

> "Illi robur et æs triplex
> Circa pectus."

A moſt important and intereſting queſtion here forces itſelf upon the mind. How does it happen that the aſtoniſhing efforts which have been made by us and our Allies during the late War, that the

* Naples, Portugal, and the Ottoman Empire.

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matchleſs ſucceſſes, the brilliant achievements, the ſplendid victories, which have crowned our own arms, have not been productive of that general ſecurity which, at length, alas! we find ſo neceſſary to our ſafe enjoyment of the ſweets of repoſe? The anſwer is but too obvious. The War has not been directed to the object which alone could reſtore ſecurity to Europe. What that object was no one can be at a loſs to diſcover who traces the evil to its ſource, and conſiders the origin of thoſe perils which have ſo long menaced, and which ſtill menace, all civilized ſociety. The cauſe of the danger was the French Revolution—and, (as the removal of the cauſe is the proper way to get rid of the effect,) the beſt and, indeed, the only practicable means of ſafety, were the termination of that Revolution, by the reſtoration of the French Monarchy. If a doubt could ariſe upon this ſubject; if any one could heſitate for a moment to conclude that the above event would have brought with it that ſecurity, the want of which is now ſo ſeverely felt, let him compare his preſent feelings with thoſe, which he muſt be conſcious he would have experienced, if the termination of the War had been accompanied with a reſtoration of the Throne of the Bourbons. The fulleſt conviction will then flaſh upon his mind that, in ſuch an caſe, he would have been free from thoſe alarms by which he is now agitated—that he would then have looked forward, with confidence, to the enjoyment (for a conſiderable time at leaſt), of the bleſſings of peace—that he would then have been without

uneaſineſs for thoſe invaluable intereſts, which are now the ſubjects of his moſt lively and anxious ſolicitude.

The ſentiment of confidence, which, in every mind that is not enſlaved by party prejudices, is produced by the mere ſuppoſition of the Reſtoration of the French Monarchy, and the feelings of inquietude which are inſeparable from the contrary ſuppoſition, bear the moſt ſtriking teſtimony to the importance of ſuch an event in regard to the general ſecurity of Europe. So powerful is that teſtimony, that every diſpaſſionate and candid approver of the pacification endeavours to ſoothe his mind, and to quell his alarms, by indulging a hope, that peace, by the operation of means of which it is difficult to form any preciſe idea, may lead to the event which the War has failed to accompliſh. Even thoſe perſons who make light of the danger ariſing from the boundleſs ambition and, hitherto, perfidious character of the Firſt Conſul, who lay aſide all fear of the extenſion of Jacobin principles, and who conſider the immenſe aggrandizement of France as calculated to produce, rather weakneſs and diſunion, than vigour and co-operation, among the many heterogeneous parts of which her gigantic Empire is now compoſed, are nevertheleſs ſenſible, that unleſs ſhe be again ſubjected to its lawful Government, ſhe will, for a very conſiderable ſpace of time at leaſt, be a conſtant ſource of diſturbance to her neighbours, and that Peace will be totally deſtitute of ſtability. Theſe truths are ſo obvious in themſelves, and they

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have been ſo clearly and ſo awfully inculcated by the French Revolution, that to diſpute them would be to ſet both reaſon and experience at utter defiance. The power of the preſent Ruler of France, in ſpite of the fleeting popularity which he may have gained, with an unthinking multitude, by his pacifications, is totally deſtitute of every thing which is neceſſary to give durability to Empire; and in ſome reſpects it is, beyond all other caſes of ſelf-aſſumed authority, expoſed to peculiar cauſes of viciſſitude and peril. It is not in human nature, even in that degraded ſtate in which it now appears in France, long to ſubmit patiently to an uſurped ſway, particularly in the hands of a ſtranger and foreigner. Nay, although contrary to all human probability, Buonaparte ſhould continue, to the end of his days, to graſp the ſceptre which he has ſeized, ſtill it cannot be forgotten that his life is expoſed to more dangers than that of any other individual in Europe, who is not actually in the laſt ſtage of an incurable diſeaſe; and his death, whenever it may happen, muſt involve the diſſolution of that machine of Government, of which he muſt be conſidered, not only as the ſole director, but alſo as the main ſpring. Are we to look forward to new revolutions for the eſtabliſhment of ſome ſolid and permanent authority? The thought is abſurdity itſelf: What then can produce ſuch a ſtate of things, but the reſtoration of the lawful Authority? Notwithſtanding the apparent improbability of ſuch an event, it has in its favour

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that Moral ſenſe, which ſtamps on legitimate rights, and on them alone, a character of permanence, and which inveſts them, even when overborne by violence, with a reſpectability and a dignity, which all the triumphs of fraud and force can never beſtow.

This Moral ſenſe, which is given to man for a perpetual monitor, to keep conſtantly in his view the eternal diſtinction of right and wrong, decides, as clearly and inſtinctively, upon the juſtice of claims to Supreme Power, as upon the moſt ordinary and familiar concerns of private life. It never fails, when ſpontaneouſly exerciſed, to determine in favour of thoſe claims which have the ſanction of antiquity, and which ſeem, as it were, conſecrated by time and experience. It thus anſwers the great end for which it was beſtowed, and conduces, in a moſt eſſential manner, to the welfare of the human race. The peace and order of the ſocial world require, that Sovereign authority be ſtable and permanent. For, otherwiſe, it would be a conſtant ſource of contention; and ambition, the moſt active and powerful principle in the human breaſt, and then moſt active and powerful, when directed to the acquiſition of ſupreme dominion, would produce endleſs ſtrife, and civil war. To preſerve ſociety from ſo miſerable a ſtate, the governing Power muſt be veſted according to fixed, preciſe, and unchangeable rules, which may clearly deſignate the perſon entitled to it and furniſh a regular principle of tranſmiſſion from age to age. The Moral ſenſe, faithful to its great object,

ject, the real happineſs of mankind, invariably ſupports the Government which has the ſanction of ſuch rules; and, by way of diſtinction, it gives to that Government the denomination of *lawful*. In like manner, and for the ſame purpoſes, this invaluable impulſe lends its aid to all ancient Inſtitutions, Religious, Moral, and Political. It co-operates with thoſe ſalutary prejudices, which, however they may be deſpiſed by ſuperficial ſpeculatiſts, are the bulwarks of Society, to preſerve the human race from the deſtructive hand of innovation, and to produce in the human mind a happy preference, even for the imperfections of long tried ſyſtems, above thoſe ſpecious novelties, which wear the deluſive face of improvement, but which tend ultimately to ſubverſion—But this train of thought, if purſued, would lead too far from the preſent ſubject. It muſt not, however, be forgotten, that thoſe rights of Government, which, becauſe they are ancient, are recognized by the Moral ſenſe as *lawful*, are the only ones which are compatible with civil liberty. For Power, when it is not ſo derived, being deſtitute of Moral aid, is driven to maintain itſelf by force and conſtraint; and this, not only when it is obtained by violent uſurpation, but alſo when it wears the ſpecious and captivating form of popular choice. For however flattering to the multitude this form may appear, it is the moſt fleeting and precarious that can be aſſumed by Civil Authority. The will which gives it exiſtence is changeable as the wind; and the ſuffrages which are beſtowed to-day, with the

loudeſt acclamations, by the fickle people, are ſure to be transferred to-morrow to ſome new object of their capricious favour. The power, therefore, which is derived from ſuch a ſource, muſt either be inceſſantly changing, which is the preciſe definition of Anarchy, or it muſt maintain itſelf againſt the will of the governed, which it cannot do without the utmoſt exertion of deſpotic force. In both caſes liberty is neceſſarily excluded; with this difference, however, that anarchy tends to prolong that excluſion much more than deſpotiſm. But when Government is eſtabliſhed on the firm foundation of ancient title, (which no one, unleſs he be ſtimulated by ambitious demagogues, ever thinks of diſputing,) it has the ſupport of the Moral ſenſe in its favour, and produces a willing and cheerful ſubmiſſion—It is therefore compatible with liberty, and, ſo far, favourable to it. It may indeed, be in its form, deſpotic; but it cannot be, in effect, ſo deſpotic as the power which originates in popular choice muſt, for the reaſons above ſtated, neceſſarily prove; and the degree of freedom which may exiſt under it, will depend much more upon the ſtate of Religion and Morals, than upon the forms of power.

To the ſteady ſupport which the Moral ſenſe gives to lawful authority, muſt be aſcribed the extreme and almoſt inſurmountable difficulty which oppoſes the eſtabliſhment of unjuſt claims to dominion. No taſk, in the vaſt compaſs of human enterprize, is ſo arduous, as that of making mankind ſubmit long to ſuch claims, however ſpecious they may render themſelves

ſelves by the aid of popular pretexts. Nay, at the very moment when they appear to have defeated all oppoſition, and to have ſurmounted every difficulty —when an univerſal calm ſeems to promiſe them a long and uninterrupted enjoyment, they are liable to be blown down by the firſt breath of wind that may ariſe. On the contrary, legitimate authority, though out of poſſeſſion, and, apparently, without hope of re-eſtabliſhment, being ſupported by the Moral ſenſe, makes Uſurpation tremble on its Throne. It may, indeed, be conſidered as a truth, ſuſceptible of very few exceptions, *that however rebellion may lord it for a while, and inſurrection may be ſucceſsful, yet, when the conteſt is fairly at iſſue between the eternal principles of right and wrong, and the will of uſurpers—between the immutable principles of juſtice, and the efforts of aſpiring demagogues—the rights of lawful Government, and the principles of juſtice, muſt in the end triumph*.*

* Thoſe who are accuſtomed to wade through the records of faction will find that the above ſentence, diſtinguiſhed by italics, is a parody on one of thoſe effuſions, by which the *patriots* of the day endeavour to miſlead the minds of their followers. The ſentence to which the alluſion is made, is as follows: "However tyranny may be allowed to lord it for "a while, and deſpotiſm be ſucceſsful, yet, when the conteſt "is fairly at iſſue between the eternal principles of liberty, "and the will of tyrants—between the immutable principles of "juſtice, and the efforts of deſpots—the rights of the human "race, and the principles of liberty, muſt in the end triumph." —See Mr. Fox's ſpeech at the laſt anniverſary of his election, as reported in the public prints.

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Where the rights of lawful Government, in regard to France, now reſide, is pronounced ſo clearly by the authority of ancient laws and hereditary deſcent, that no queſtion can poſſibly ariſe upon the ſubject. Thoſe rights have, therefore, in their favour, that Moral ſupport, which conſtitutes the ſtrength of Government, and which, alone, can give it durability. And the unparalleled injuſtice and cruelty with which (in ſpite of every virtue that can adorn the Throne), they were invaded in the perſon of the Sovereign who laſt exerciſed them, ſeem to confer upon them an additional ſanctity in *that* of the Prince on whom they are deſcended, by the clear and indiſputable title of inheritance.

It has been attempted, by the enemies of Social Order, to aſſimilate the preſent ſtate of Revolutionary France to that of Great Britain in 1688, in order to warrant the inference, that the Houſe of Bourbon may be as completely overthrown as the Houſe of Stuart, and that France may, nevertheless, like England, enjoy the invaluable bleſſing of ſtable and regular Government. But theſe caſes exhibit a moſt ſtriking, and, indeed, an eſſential difference. The Britiſh King loſt his Crown, becauſe, in direct violation of the conditions by which he held it, he had ſought to ſubvert the Conſtitution in Church and State. The Gallic Monarch was deprived of *his*, while, in compliance with the wiſhes of his people, he was endeavouring to reform the abuſes which had crept into his Government, and to reſtore the true ſpirit of the Monarchical Conſtitution,

Conſtitution, which his ſubjects had juſt before expreſſed a deſire to maintain*. The Engliſh Revolution (as it is erroneouſly called), though, for the reaſons above ſtated, it produced a change in the perſon of the reigning Monarch, reſpected, as far as circumſtances would allow, the right of inheritance; and while it preſerved the Conſtitution, it guarded the ancient right of Succeſſion with ſuch ſcrupulous care, that the Crown, in conformity with the Acts of Settlement made ſubſequently to that event, is now worn by the neareſt Proteſtant heir of Egbert, the original Founder of the Britiſh Monarchy. The French Revolution, on the contrary, like an overwhelming torrent, ſubverted the very foundations of the Gallic Monarchy, left not a veſtige of the Conſtitution, and, for the Government of above 20 millions of individuals, brought forward a *ſucceſſion* of the moſt ferocious and ſanguinary monſters, that ever infeſted the earth; who exerciſed their power with ſuch ſavage barbarity, that the people are diſpoſed, for the moment, to welcome the deſpotic ſway of a foreigner, who, without the ſmalleſt pretence even of an elective right, has ſucceeded in uſurping the Supreme Authority. So completely deſtitute of analogy—ſo oppoſite in their nature and effects are the two events, between which faction

* The *Cahiers*, or Mandates, which the people of France delivered to their Repreſentatives, in the States-General called by Louis XVI. were expreſſive of a decided and univerſal wiſh to maintain the Monarchical Conſtitution.

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endeavours to eſtabliſh a compariſon. It muſt appear the more remarkable, that ſo forced and unnatural an alluſion ſhould be attempted, when it is conſidered that the Engliſh annals record an event, to which the French Revolution really bears a ſtrong ſimilitude. Prominent in thoſe annals appears a black and horrible period, when the Engliſh Nation, in juſt and awful retribution for rebellion and regicide, were doomed to ſuffer the horrors of anarchy, and to groan under the yoke of Uſurpers, until they were convinced, by direful experience, that there was no deliverance from ſuch a ſtate, but by the Reſtoration of their lawful King. But the crime of France has been, if poſſible, ſtill more atrocious, as her ſufferings have been more ſevere. Charles I. drew the ſword, as every Monarch ought to do, in defence of his Crown; and his murder was the cataſtrophe of a civil war. Louis XVI. declared that not a drop of blood ſhould be ſhed in his cauſe, and he was led to the ſcaffold after throwing himſelf, with unlimited confidence, upon the affections and loyalty of his ſubjects.

The unutterable woes which the French people have ſince experienced—the inexpreſſible degradation to which they are now reduced*, afford an awful

* If any Briton can heſitate for a moment to conſider the French people, in ſpite of all their conqueſts, in a ſtate of the loweſt degradation, let him bring their caſe home to himſelf, and think what his feelings would be, if, under *any* circumſtances of foreign ſucceſs, he were obliged to wear the yoke of ſome

awful proof of the Moral Government of that Supreme Ruler, who is ſure to puniſh the crimes of States as well as of individuals. What ſufferings they may ſtill be doomed to endure, who can pretend to know? But the experience of all ages, and the immutable principles of juſtice warrant the concluſion, that they will continue to be objects of Divine vengeance, until they expiate, as far as is yet poſſible, their foul treaſon, by placing the Crown on the head which is entitled to wear it. Unfortunately other States have a deep and immediate intereſt in their fate. The Revolutionary Volcano of France has convulſed, during ten years, not only the whole of Europe, but the entire fabrick of Civil Society: and where is ſecurity to be found againſt the future exploſions of that Volcano? What protection will Pacific Treaties be able to afford, when its tremendous crater ſhall pour forth the deſtructive lava, which, perhaps, in this very moment of ſerenity, is about to be exploded with irreſiſtible fury?

ſome deſperate Adventurer, a native, for inſtance, of St. Marcou, or any other Iſland conquered from France, whom the chances of Revolution had placed upon the Britiſh Throne—is there a Briton who would think life deſirable on thoſe terms? The French people, however, bow ſubmiſſively to ſuch a yoke: and it is with ſo degraded a race, with ſo ſlaviſh and daſtardly a nation, that the *high-ſpirited* champions of oppoſition wiſh us to cultivate a cordial friendſhip. It is, be it remembered, that while France is in ſuch a ſtate, theſe champions drink, as one of their ſtanding toaſts—"Laſting friendſhip between Great Britain and the French Republick!"

That the War was not directed to an object, ſo eſſential to the quiet and ſafety of all Europe, as the reſtoration of the French Monarchy—an object, the attainment of which would have inſtantly reſtored Univerſal Confidence, Peace, and Security—is now a juſt cauſe for the deepeſt lamentation, and will be matter of aſtoniſhment to the lateſt poſterity. It will with difficulty be credited by future ages, that the Powers of Europe did not, at once, declare in favour of a Government, in the preſervation of which they had ſo deep an intereſt—that when they were themſelves attacked by the enemies of that Government, they did not even then make common cauſe with it—that when they were aſſailed by a Revolutionary Monſter, who took his ſtand on the ruins of the Gallic Throne, and thence hurled his menaces and his firebrands againſt every other Throne, the Crowned Heads of Europe did not combine, with a fixed determination to reſtore that Throne, and to drive their ferocious enemy from his ſtrong hold—that inſtead of employing their efforts in ſuch a manner, they carried on the war, in which they were moſt reluctantly forced to engage, (for every one of them waited to be attacked before he drew the ſword,) as if it had been an ordinary war, involving merely a diſpute for territory, and not a queſtion of exiſtence. After ſo ſtrange a neglect of the dictates of common prudence, nay, after ſo groſs a violation of duty, they muſt thank themſelves for the deplorable, nay, almoſt hopeleſs condition,

dition, to which Europe finds itſelf reduced, at the moment of a general pacification.

But in regard to the above charge, ſome explanatory obſervations are due to the Britiſh Government. In the Continental Monarchies, the reſolutions of Government begin and end with the Executive Councils of the Crown; and it was fully competent to thoſe Councils, to direct the whole force of their reſpective Sovereigns, againſt the Revolutionary Foe by which they were attacked. In this Country, the meaſures of the Cabinet depend, for their efficacy, on the aſſiſtance, and conſequently on the approbation, of the King's Legiſlative Councils; and, indeed, in a great meaſure, on the ſpirited and cordial ſupport of the Nation. Now although Parliament and the Country, impreſſed—in ſpite of the efforts of Faction—with the firmeſt conviction of the juſtice of their cauſe, have given a moſt active and loyal ſupport to their Sovereign, in the proſecution of the War, ſtill it is not to be denied, that this ſupport would have been wanting, if the War had been directed to the reſtoration of the French Monarchy, eſſential as that reſtoration evidently was to the ſecurity of all lawful Governments, and to the repoſe of Europe. And it would have been impoſſible for Miniſters to obtain the neceſſary ſupplies from Parliament, without pledging themſelves, as they have repeatedly done, that the War had no ſuch object, and that the form of Government in France, whatever it might be, ſhould oppoſe no obſtacle to the return of peace.

To account for ſo lamentable a blindneſs to their true intereſts, in a people eminently diſtinguiſhed for their good ſenſe, it is neceſſary to call to mind the conduct of the Oppoſition. In the early part of that tremendous convulſion, which has ſhaken Society to its deepeſt foundation, a conſiderable number of thoſe who were then in the habit of oppoſing the meaſures of Government, filled with apprehenſions and forebodings which ſubſequent events have but too well juſtified, ſuppreſſed all party feelings, forgot all political differences, and rallied round their Sovereign, whom they ſaw expoſed to dangers, which made him need the moſt active and ſteady ſupport of all his loyal Subjects. But others of that party, inſenſible to the calls of loyalty and patriotiſm, ſought only to make the perils which menaced their King and their Country, ſubſervient to their own views of ambition. They therefore laboured, with indefatigable induſtry, to ſuppreſs the ſalutary alarm which the French Revolution was ſo well calculated to excite. They repreſented that Revolution, not only as fraught with no danger, but as conducive to the happineſs of all nations—as *a glorious and ſtupendous fabrick*—as a noble effort to obtain and extend civil freedom—and as perfectly congenial with the principles of the Engliſh Conſtitution; they re-echoed all the pretexts, by which its ſanguinary promoters endeavoured to blunt the horror which their deeds could not fail to inſpire—they laboured inceſſantly to convince their countrymen, that Miniſters ſought

to

to plunge them into a War, for the purpoſe of terminating this *admirable* Revolution; they even prevailed on the nation to bear with outrages and inſults from France, which, at any former time, would have produced an univerſal cry of War and Vengeance. When, at length, the Britiſh Government, notwithſtanding its unexampled forbearance, was openly attacked, and driven into a War for its own immediate defence, they employed every art of miſrepreſentation and ſophiſtry, in order to convince, if poſſible, the nation, that Miniſters had voluntarily, and without the ſmalleſt neceſſity, or even provocation, entered into the War, for the purpoſe of interfering in the internal affairs of France.—And although they have been unable to ſtate a ſingle act of aggreſſion on the part of this Country, in juſtification of the Declaration of War by France; nay, although they have been unable formally to deny that, before ſuch Declaration, we bore with aggreſſions from that Country, which, if unredreſſed, as they are to this day, would have fully juſtified us in reſorting to hoſtilities; ſtill, in all their reaſonings, or rather declamations upon the ſubject, they have argued, and ſtill continue to argue, upon the falſe and infamous aſſumption, that Great Britain was the aggreſſor. Having, by ſuch means, ſucceeded in exciting and keeping alive in the public mind an apprehenſion, leſt the War, if not actually commenced, might be unneceſſarily continued by us, for the ſake of the Monarchy of

France, it became impoſſible for Miniſters, even if they had been ſo diſpoſed, to take part with that Monarchy; and they were compelled, in order to obtain that ſupport from the Country which was neceſſary for the employment of its energies, expreſsly to diſclaim any ſuch object. Without theſe perverſe and inſidious arts, on the part of Oppoſition, it may be fairly preſumed that the good ſenſe of the Country would have enabled it to diſcover the real nature of the conteſt, and have made it ſenſible of the *dangers* which were inſeparable from the overthrow of the French Monarchy, by a Revolution, that aimed at the deſtruction of all Monarchy, and the ſubverſion of all eſtabliſhed Government. Happy had it been for Great Britain, for Europe, and for the whole world, if a ſenſe of thoſe *dangers* had produced its due effect in this Country. It is impoſſible to ſay, with certainty, what would have been the effect of means, which have not been adopted. But, according to all human probability, if Great Britain—who, to her immortal honour, was the life and ſoul of all the Confederacies which have been formed ſince the comencement of the War—had openly declared for the Monarchy of France, for the ſake of the general ſafety, and the independence of Europe, ſhe would have had ſufficient influence with the other belligerent Powers, to induce them to join with her in ſuch a plan, and to make the reſtoration of that Monarchy the real object of the War: and if

either

either of the Coalitions which have exiſted, had been founded upon ſuch a principle, it ſcarcely admits of a doubt, that, with the co-operation of the numerous bodies of Royaliſts, who have riſen in the cauſe of their King—and of whom thoſe on the weſtern coaſt of France reſiſted, for ſeveral years, all the force which the Republic could employ againſt them—the joint efforts of ſuch a Confederacy, cemented by a ſympathy of views, and directed to a ſingle object, would have ſucceeded in cruſhing the Anarchical Monſter, who was deteſted even by thoſe who were compelled to join in his deſtructive efforts, and whoſe ſtrength conſiſted chiefly in the diſunion of thoſe who were oppoſed to him*.

It may, perhaps, ſeem remarkable, that a party, which is ſunk ſo low in the public eſtimation, ſhould nevertheleſs have been able to prevent the adoption of meaſures, which were evidently eſſential to the ſafety of all Europe, and conſequently to that of this Country. But a trifle will turn the ſcales, which are nearly in a ſtate of equipoize, whatever weight they may contain; and a crumb of bread, which would be totally inſignificant for the

* The Author does not heſitate, even while the Nation is rejoicing on account of the Peace, thus to avow his unſhaken confidence in the juſtice and expedience of the ſentiments which he has ſo often endeavoured to impreſs on the minds of his Countrymen—nay, he even refers, though with inexpreſſible regret, to the ſolemn teſt of experience as a proof, that it would have been happy for mankind, if the advice which he

the purpoſe of nutrition, may, if it take a wrong direction, produce ſuffocation and death. Thus it is that the party in queſtion have been able exceedingly to embarraſs Government, at a moment when it had to contend with unprecedented, and, ſeemingly, inſurmountable difficulties, by co-operating with all the weakneſs, the perverſeneſs, and the wickedneſs in the country—by allying themſelves to Jacobiniſm—by giving countenance and protection to conſpirators and traitors *—by converting the burdens inſeparable from War, and the ſtill more grievous hardſhips produced by a ſucceſſion of inclement ſeaſons, into excitements to diſaffection and ſedition—by artfully addreſſing themſelves to the prejudices natural to every country, in favour of peace—in ſhort, by moſt ungenerouſly availing themſelves of the opportunities, which the practice

preſumed to give to the Combined Powers, to declare for the Monarchy of France, had been adopted. If thoſe Powers were deterred from making ſuch a Declaration, by the apparent difficulty of re-eſtabliſhing the Gallic Throne, their conduct exhibits a lamentable ſpecimen of that ſhort-ſighted policy which, inſtead of boldly looking difficulties in the face, reſorts to temporizing expedients, which, in the aggregate, much augment the maſs of difficulty, and lead ultimately to a failure of the main object. The countries lately at war with France may, in fact, be compared to a Phyſician who, inſtead of attacking the diſorder at its ſource, employs only palliatives, which allow the malady to gather ſtrength until it becomes incurable. Thus the war, becauſe the only effectual means of making it ſucceſsful were neglected, has been *prolonged* from year to year, and, at laſt, it has failed to produce its grand object—*ſecurity*.

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of the Britiſh Conſtitution affords to faction, in time of War (and particularly of ſuch a War as that with Rebellious America, or Revolutionary France) of miſleading the minds and inflaming the paſſions of the multitude, and of ſubjecting to unpopularity the moſt wiſe and neceſſary meaſures. By ſuch means have they not only rendered themſelves formidable, but have excited a clamour, which would have impeded all the operations of Government, if the War had departed, in any reſpect, from a ſtrict and rigid ſyſtem of neceſſary defence.

The artifice of which the members of this party have chiefly availed themſelves, in order to miſlead the public mind reſpecting the proper object of ſuch a War, as that which has been juſt concluded, is, on many accounts, deſerving of particular notice. Addreſſing themſelves to the juſtice of the nation, to that moral ſenſe, which, though apparently weak in their own breaſts, is ſtill, thank Heaven! very powerful in the breaſts of their countrymen, they have inceſſantly urged, as a reaſon againſt our taking part with the lawful government of France, that one country has no right to interfere in the domeſtic concerns of another. This propoſition, in a general ſenſe, is indiſputably true: but it is to the perverſion of true propoſitions, rather than to the maintaining of thoſe which are falſe, that ſophiſtry is chiefly indebted for her triumphs over the human mind. No practice is more fertile of error than that of applying, *univerſally*, propoſitions which are only *generally* true. Where the reaſon on which any rule

rule is founded does not exiſt, the rule itſelf is not applicable. A familiar alluſion will make this perfectly clear. If a man were to take upon himſelf to regulate the concerns of his neighbour's family, he would be guilty of a violation of that independence, to which every family is entitled with regard to every other family; and of the ſecurity of which the pooreſt man in this country is juſtly proud. But if the interference which, in a *general* ſenſe, is unjuſtifiable, be ſolicited by the head of the family in which it is employed, it is not only allowable, but an act of kindneſs—and, in many caſes, of duty. In like manner, if the lawful head of a State deſire, or, which is evidence of ſuch deſire, willingly accept the aſſiſtance of ſome neighbouring Power, in a caſe of domeſtic difficulty, the interference of that Power is certainly juſtifiable, becauſe it is, under ſuch circumſtances, no violation of national independence. It is therefore perfectly clear, (ſo clear, indeed, that an apology ſeems due to the reader for pretending to illuſtrate it) that this country would have been juſtified in giving its ſupport to the lawful government of France, *even if there had been no War* between the two countries. But when the circumſtance of the War is taken into conſideration, it is truly aſtoniſhing that an individual can be found, capable of entertaining a doubt upon the ſubject.

It is the more ſtrange that the gentlemen in queſtion contend, on this occaſion, and without any qualification, that all interference in the domeſtic concerns

concerns of a foreign State is unlawful, ſince they are accuſtomed to celebrate, with great enthuſiaſm, a day, moſt remarkably diſtinguiſhed by a foreign interference, in the domeſtic affairs of their own country. If their doctrine be true, to the extent in which they maintain it, King William was guilty of a moſt atrocious outrage on this nation, when, with an army of Dutchmen, he landed on the Engliſh coaſt. This caſe, however, which they happened for a moment to forget, they will doubtleſs conſider as an exception to their *univerſal* rule—on the ground that the interference it involves was ſolicited by the people; though, in point of fact, not one in many, many thouſands of the people, had any notion whatever of ſuch an occurrence. But if an army of Engliſhmen had landed on the French coaſt, to ſupport the Bourbon Government, ſuch a meaſure would have been a much more obvious exception to *that* rule, becauſe it would evidently have been free from all danger to national independence, which cannot be ſaid in the other caſe, however great the benefits may be which have reſulted from it. For the object of our interference would have been to aid, while that of the Prince of Orange was to oppoſe and dethrone the lawful Sovereign, the independence of whoſe Crown involves that of the State. No danger whatever, to the independence of a country, can ariſe from any interpoſition to ſupport its lawful and long-eſtabliſhed Government. But when the ſupport of a foreign Power is given to a party in oppoſition to

that Government, there is great and evident danger, leſt the concurrence with that party may be only a pretext, to cover views incompatible with the ſafety and independence of the State. And it may be no difficult matter to find natives, in any country, baſe enough to lend their countenance and aid to a foreign Power, who, under the moſt ſpecious profeſſions, may enter the territories of a neighbour for the worſt of purpoſes. This, indeed, is the manner in which the French Revolutioniſts have ſubverted the independence of ſo many States. If the caſe be ſuppoſed to depend upon a queſtion of numbers, nothing can be more fallacious than ſuch a criterion; which, moreover, would be deciſive, as has been already obſerved, againſt the conduct of the Prince of Orange, in 1688. For nothing is more common than for a very ſmall minority to call themſelves the people.

But, ſay the party, whoſe reaſonings on the ſubject of the late War are now under conſideration, *you have no right to tell a people they ſhall have a King, when they are determined not to have one.* This argument, when applied to the preſent occaſion, involves not only a fallacy, but a falſehood: a fallacy, becauſe any ſupport given to a lawful King, againſt his rebellious ſubjects, is both juſtifiable, according to the laws of nations, and compatible, for the reaſons above aſſigned, with national independence—A falſehood, becauſe the French people, the very laſt time in which they had an opportunity of expreſſing their real ſentiments, declared an univerſal

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deſire for the preſervation of their Monarchy *; and even after the Revolution, which Briſſot himſelf acknowledged to have been begun—as he juſtly ſaid all revolutions are, by a ſmall minority—the country was *at leaſt* divided upon the queſtion, and, notwithſtanding the exile of the two firſt orders in the State, the Clergy and Nobles, a very numerous party of Royaliſts maintained a civil war, and fought and bled, during ſeveral years, in the cauſe of God and their King. Now it is an eſtabliſhed principle of the law of nations, that, in ſuch a caſe of internal diviſion, foreign interference is lawful. This is particularly ſtated by Vattell, who lays it down that, in caſe of a civil War, foreign Powers may lawfully "aſſiſt the party which they ſhall judge has right on their ſide, in caſe this party ſhall requeſt their aſſiſtance, or accept the offer of it†." In full recognition, nay, in extenſion of this principle, Mr. Fox admitted, in the year 1787, with a reference to our interference at that time in the domeſtic affairs of Holland, that when two parties divide a State, a foreign Power may lawfully interfere to ſupport that which is friendly, and to oppoſe that which is hoſtile to its intereſts. But in direct contradiction to this ſentiment, and in utter inconſiſtency with himſelf, he now contends that the Britiſh Crown could not lawfully aſſiſt the Crown of France, and

* At the Aſſembly of the States General by Louis XVI. See note, p. 15.

† Vide B. 3. ſec. 296.

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the Royaliſts who had drawn their ſwords in its defence—although the republican party had actually declared war againſt this country, and the Royaliſts were decidedly friendly to its intereſts. What then! does this gentleman mean to ſay that the right of nations to afford one another aſſiſtance in times of internal diſſenſion, is to be exerciſed only in favour of thoſe perſons who are in open rebellion againſt their Sovereign? That Monarchs may not afford ſuccour to each other, or conſult their mutual ſafety? If the Jacobins of England were aſſembled, as they would rejoice to be, in martial array, for the deſtruction of the Britiſh Throne, and if the Whig Club were to add their forces, in order to *caſhier* their Sovereign, which they every day claim a right to do, ſhall the loyal part of the Country be told that they have no right to ſolicit and receive the aid of any neighbouring Potentate, who may be willing to aſſiſt in preſerving them from the horrors of a Revolution? If the preſent Prince of Orange were reſtored to his dominions, would he not be at leaſt as well intitled to head an army in ſupport of the cauſe of George III. as his predeceſſor was to oppoſe that of James II.?

Let it not be ſuppoſed that any of the foregoing ſentiments reſpecting the French Monarchy, proceed from a regard for that Monarchy, or, indeed, from any thing elſe than a ſenſe of juſtice, a concern for the ſafety of this country, and a ſolicitude for the general good order of ſociety. They are the ſentiments of one who cheriſhes a native

native and inextinguiſhable jealouſy of France, and who feels a ſtrong and laſting reſentment for the baſe part taken by the government of that country, in the American diſpute; a part which has drawn down upon it the tremendous ruin by which it has been overwhelmed. But we muſt not ſuffer our reſentments to blind our eyes, or to make us forget that when an enemy, againſt whom we may eaſily defend ourſelves, is attacked by one, againſt whom we have not the ſame means of defence, and who ſeeks to make the deſtruction of the former a ſtep to our own, it becomes both our intereſt and our duty to make common cauſe with *him* whom we never before regarded but with hoſtility, and by all the means in our power to prevent his overthrow.

It has been common, with many perſons, to aſcribe every expreſſion of a wiſh for the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon, and of regret that this object has not been effected by the War, to a diſpoſition in favour of deſpotiſm: but nothing can be more unjuſt than ſuch a conſtruction. Whatever objections any one may entertain to the Government of the Bourbons, it is impoſſible to deny, that the Power which now governs France is, beyond all compariſon, more deſpotic. But we have no right to judge for other Nations, reſpecting the degree of liberty, which they ought to enjoy. To aſſume ſuch a right, would be an invaſion of their independence. That the ancient and long eſtabliſhed Government of any Country may be lawfully aſſiſted, by other Governments, againſt all its

its enemies, foreign and domeſtic, is an indiſputable principle of the Law of Nations. But no law can authorize us to interfere in the domeſtic concerns of a State, becauſe the Government of that State does not ſuit our notions of liberty or perfection; and thoſe perſons who, on this ground, have oppoſed (even in time of War), every attempt to aſſiſt the Gallic Monarchy, have themſelves violated the principle which they appear ſo anxious to maintain, and have been, in effect, guilty of an *unjuſt* interference in the affairs of another State.

The enemies of Monarchy rejoice at a Peace, which ſeems to give the death blow to the hopes, both of the Houſe of Bourbon, and of the other Monarchies, which have been overwhelmed by the ruins of that Houſe. They think, and with juſtice, that a prodigious advance has thus been made towards the overthrow of all Monarchy. And ſhall not the friends of Monarchy deplore a Peace, which leaves the Gallican Throne in a fallen ſtate—which does not even raiſe up any of thoſe Governments, that have been laid low in conſequence of its fall? Shall not every one who abhors Republicaniſm and Anarchy, lament that theſe fiends have, in a manner, maintained their triumphs, by the very terms of a General Pacification? Shall he feel no alarm and exerciſe no vigilance, leſt, emboldened by ſuch ſucceſs, they purſue their advantages, until whatever remains of Social Order and Lawful Government, ſhall fall a prey to their inſatiable fury? Shall he not view them with additional dread, and

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oppoſe them with more ardent zeal, on account of that general contamination of principle which they have produced—a contamination, which is likely to encreaſe with alarming rapidity, in conſequence of the ſucceſs that has crowned the cauſe of infidelity, vice, and rebellion, and of the unreſtrained intercourſe which every State muſt now have with the moſt impious and vicious people in the world, ſunk as they are into the loweſt abyſs of profligacy, by their boaſted freedom, during twelve years, from every religious and moral reſtraint*.—This is the true way of contemplating our ſituation, at the important and critical moment of a General Peace. But if we overlook theſe conſiderations and break forth into raptures, becauſe, at the concluſion of a War, true

* As great numbers of our countrymen are deſirous of expoſing themſelves to the polluted atmoſphere of modern Paris, that ſink of ſhameleſs debauchery—that theatre of ſucceſsful crime and unpuniſhed Regicide;—and as the motive generally aſſigned for ſo perilous an expedition is a curioſity to ſee the magazine of pillage—the muſeum of ſtolen goods, of which a horde of ferocious banditti have plundered the different nations of Europe, and of which they have now the audacity to make an oſtentatious diſplay to all, who are ſo deſtitute of *moral* taſte as to be capable of enduring ſuch an exhibition—It is to be lamented, that theſe fruits of unexampled rapacity have not labels annexed to them, ſpecifying the places whence they were ſeverally ſtolen, and the circumſtantial details of each robbery. To ſupply this deficiency, a catalogue, containing ſuch a ſpecification, would prove an uſeful *vade-mecum* in a journey to Paris; and the publication of a catalogue of that nature would materially ſerve the cauſe of virtue, though it might not be very favourable to that of *virtù*.

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which leaves Society in ſuch a ſtate, we have been able to retain a couple of conquered Iſlands, we ſhall deſerve to be compared with a man, who exults at having ſaved a few days' proviſions from a conflagration, which threatens to reduce his dwelling to aſhes.

To the ſame cauſes which have put it out of the power of the Britiſh Goverment to make the War inſtrumental to that moſt deſirable event, the reſtoration of the Gallic Throne, muſt be aſcribed the neceſſity which that Government has been under, of concluding a Peace upon Terms, that leave the whole of Europe expoſed to dangers, unprecedented in their nature, and incalculable in their extent. In ſpite of all colouring, it is impoſſible to deny that thoſe terms, as ſpecified in the Preliminaries, contain a complete Surrender of the Balance of Power; that they amount to an implied revocation of all the treaties, which have long conſtituted the public code of Europe, which were, at once, the guardians and the expoſitors of the Law of Nations, and which have hitherto been conſidered as the indiſpenſable foundations of every new treaty; that they confirm to the natural enemy of this country a degree of aggrandizement, which, in former times, Engliſhmen would have conſidered as an indiſpenſable cauſe of War. To call ſuch a Peace by any other appellation than a Peace of Neceſſity, is a libel on thoſe who made it. The Miniſter who, without the moſt abſolute neceſſity, ſhould ſet his hand to ſuch a Peaçe, would deſerve to loſe his

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head. It is not, however, a neceſſity, ariſing from an inability to proſecute the War, which has operated on this occaſion. Thank Heaven! no ſuch neceſſity exiſted, for if it had, we ſhould be deſtitute of thoſe means of defence which we ſtill enjoy. On the contrary, it is impoſſible to view the relative ſituation of Great Britain and France, in reſpect of their marine, their commerce, their wealth, and their reſources—it is impoſſible to conſider the very oppoſite effects, which, in conſequence of our naval ſuperiority, the war had produced, and muſt have continued to produce on the two Countries—by ſecuring to one the trade ofthe world, and by reducing the other to an almoſt total ſtagnation of its trade and manufactures—it is impoſſible to conſider all this, without admitting, that the former was entitled to ſay to the latter,—*Deſirable as Peace is to both of us, yet you muſt not expect to be admitted to a participation of thoſe important advantages of which you are totally deſtitute, but which I continue to enjoy, with a vaſt augmentation during the War, unleſs you return to ſentiments of moderation, and conſent to terms whieh will be conſiſtent with mutual and general ſafety.* This country would not only have been warranted by exiſting circumſtances to adopt ſuch language, but conſidering the very high ground on which it had been placed by its late matchleſs achievements, particularly in the Baltic and in Egypt, it had every reaſon to hope, that it might ſtill have been the in-

ſtrument of general preſervation, and have eſtabliſhed its own proſperity and happineſs, on the broad and ſolid baſis of general ſecurity.

To explain this ſeeming contradiction, it is neceſſary to advert to the ſtate of parties, and more eſpecially of the public mind in this kingdom. It is notorious that the impatience for Peace was ſo ſtrong, that the cry for it was ſo loud, as to create a kind of moral impoſſibility to carry on the War, for the ſake of the general intereſts. The nation at large, juſtly indignant, it muſt be confeſſed, at the return which all the Continential Powers, except Auſtria and the Ottoman Porte, had made for its expenſive and perſevering exertions in their defence, began to think only of itſelf, and to deſire, moſt ardently, any Peace which might provide for its own honour and eſſential intereſts, as diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the world. Faction, too, was ever ready to take advantage of this diſpoſition (which had in a great degree been produced by its own artifices), in order to clog, with an overwhelming load of odium, every meaſure which had the ſmalleſt tendency to conſult the general welfare, and to expoſe to public execration every miniſter who ſhould ſuffer any continential conſiderations to impede a termination of the War. Under theſe circumſtances, Miniſters could not hope for the ſupport which was indiſpenſably neceſſary to enable them to proſecute the War, ſuppoſing its continuance unavoidable, unleſs they evinced a conſtant readineſs to bring it

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to a concluſion, as ſoon as it could be concluded without a ſacrifice of the honour or eſſential intereſts of this country. Nay, it muſt be in the recollection of every one, that within a few weeks, it was the univerſal ſentiment that Miniſters could not venture again to meet Parliament, without bringing with them proofs, capable of producing conviction, of their having ſincerely endeavoured to bring about a Pacification. But what proofs could have produced ſuch conviction, ſhort of an offer of *ſpecific* terms of pacification, in caſe they could procure an opportunity of making ſuch an offer. That being the caſe, it may be candidly put to every man's feelings, whether, if any offer had been made by them which really conſulted the Balance of Power, and the Security of Europe, it would not have been made with a certainty of its being rejected? For it is generally ſuppoſed that the ſcales of War and Peace were ſo nearly in *equilibrio*, that a very ſmall difference would have prevented a pacification. If therefore any thing really eſſential to the general intereſts had been inſiſted on by us, it would have been urged with irreſiſtible effect againſt the ſervants of the Crown, that they had manifeſted their own inſincerity by making propoſals, the rejection of which it was impoſſible not to foreſee. The impracticability of carrying on the war for the ſake of general and complete ſecurity being therefore out of the queſtion, the only object of further hoſtilities muſt have been the retention of a few more of our

conqueſts. And it may well be doubted whether the certainty of attaining that object, even allowing for every apparent chance of ſtill more favourable events, would have been worth the expenſe and probable riſks, inſeparable from another campaign; ſince no colonial poſſeſſions could have afforded any effectual counterpoiſe againſt the continental aggrandizement of France. Indeed, in this point of view, the retention of all the Colonies we reſtore was a conſideration of little moment, for they would have proved but a feather in the ſcale of general ſecurity. The Balance of Power was, indeed, an object worth every exertion we could make, and every burthen we could bear. But the current, not merely of popular clamour—*that* might have been ſtemmed—but of public opinion, ſat in ſo ſtrongly againſt the purſuit of this object, that Miniſters could not have called forth the ſtrength and reſources of the country, (great as they were), if they had attempted to hold ſuch a courſe.

Many perſons who have been clamorous for a concluſion of the War, almoſt on any terms, finding that the Peace which has been made, though better, perhaps, than they thought attainable, is by no means every thing they wiſh, will be ready enough to throw the blame upon Government, without conſidering the ſhare they had in accelerating the tranſaction which they condemn. And others, feelingly alive to the dangers which ſurround us on every ſide, may, for the moment, forget the extreme difficulties

ficulties with which Government had to contend, and the miſchiefs, particularly of a financial kind, which another year's War might have produced. But a little conſideration will induce every one who really wiſhes well to the country, to take a more enlarged view of the ſubject, and to give Miniſters credit for the moſt embarraſſing circumſtances in which they were placed.

To prevent the neceſſity which has occurred of abandoning the general intereſts of Europe, ſome few individuals have laboured, during the whole War, with indefatigable induſtry. Apprehenſive of the very event which has taken place, they have ſedulouſly endeavoured to rouze the ſpirit of the country, without the aid of which they knew that Government muſt at laſt compromiſe with Republican France. Having failed in their efforts, nothing now remains but to do all in their power to excite in their countrymen a due ſenſe of exiſting dangers, and to give effect to the means of defence ſtill remaining—which, thank Heaven! are great, and which, if properly employed, may ſtill authorize us to hope for a ſucceſsful and triumphant ſtruggle with all our difficulties.

It ſhould be remembered, that notwithſtanding the immenſe advantages enjoyed by this country for the proſecution of the War, ſhe had difficulties of the moſt alarming nature to contend with, in regard to her finances. Difficulties not ariſing, indeed, from any deficiency in her reſources, for

they are in a ſtate both flouriſhing and ſolid, but from a deficiency, in ſome reſpects, much more deplorable—from a deficiency in public virtue, and even in moral rectitude. To the weakneſs of theſe great ſprings of national proſperity, muſt be attributed the comparative failure of a meaſure, the ſucceſs of which would have been advantageous, almoſt beyond the limits of calculation, to the finances of the country. The reader has, doubtleſs, anticipated the mention of the Income Tax. If this great and comprehenſive ſcheme of revenue (calculated at once to conſult the relief of the lower orders of the community, and to apportion among the other claſſes the weight of public burdens, with as much fairneſs as could, perhaps, juſtly be expected in an operation of ſuch magnitude)—had met with tolerable ſucceſs—if it had brought into the public treaſury even *nearly* its ſtated proportion of the income of the country, though it could not, without the concurrence of other cauſes, which, unfortunately, did not exiſt, have enabled us to render the War productive of general ſecurity, yet it would have given us inexpreſſible advantages in treating for Peace; and it would, moreover, have placed our credit on ſo firm a baſis, that we might have looked forward, with a degree of hope, which we are not now authorized to indulge, of being able to meet the embarraſſments, and to avert the dangers, which, alas! we have ſo much cauſe to apprehend. Thus have thoſe, who have evaded

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this moſt judicious tax, entailed upon themſelves, their families, and their country, difficulties and encumbrances, in compariſon with which the value of what they have ſo unworthily ſaved, is but as duſt in the balance. Thus have they purchaſed, at a moſt enormous expence, a melancholy confirmation of that profound, though familiar adage, "Honeſty is the beſt policy"—even with regard to the intereſts of this life. But who, that believes in a future ſtate of retribution, would incur their reſponſibility to the Great Tribunal of Univerſal Juſtice, for having defrauded their country of its juſt claims, injured its beſt intereſts, and, in effect, *robbed* every one, who has conſcientiouſly paid his full ſhare of the public contributions, of whatever he has been, or may be obliged to advance, in order to make good the deficiency which they have occaſioned.

It is due to Miniſters, in deciding upon the merits of the Peace, to take all theſe circumſtances into conſideration, and to judge of their conduct with a reference to the means which they had at their diſpoſal, and to the difficulties with which they had to contend. Their ſituation as pacificators, is, indeed, ſo far from being enviable, that every man who takes an enlarged view of things, muſt bleſs God that it did not fall to his lot to occupy it at ſuch a time; and it is a bold thing for any man to ſay, that under ſuch circumſtances he could have done better. It may be ſuggeſted, perhaps, that if Miniſters found

found it impoſſible to carry on the War, unleſs they ſhewed themſelves ready to make Peace, on the terms which have been accepted by the enemy, they ſhould have relinquiſhed their places—rather than ſign away the ſafety of their country. But would their country have been benefited by their ſo doing? Would not their ſucceſſors have ſucceeded to the ſame neceſſity by which they were governed? And might not an opening have been made for leſs virtuous men to get into the firſt offices of the State? In conſenting to Peace on ſuch terms, their conduct certainly, *prima facie*, ſtands in need of juſtification. But no juſtification can avail them, in ſuch a caſe, except that of imperious and over-ruling neceſſity. To the benefit of this plea, in the form in which it has been ſtated, it muſt be allowed that they are entitled. And however a ſenſe of danger may induce any one to deplore the Peace which they have concluded, a ſenſe of juſtice ſeems to call upon every one—at leaſt to heſitate—before he condemns their conduct in reſorting to ſuch a meaſure.

The ſame plea of neceſſity, and of the ſame kind of neceſſity, can alone juſtify, on our part, the negociation at Liſle. That negociation, indeed, in ſome reſpects, ſtands in ſtill greater need of juſtification, becauſe the Government of France was then much more incapable of the relations of Peace and Amity than it is now. Whatever objections may be made to the preſent Government of that country, it has the advantage of being a kind of mock Royalty; and it is therefore under the

the neceſſity of preſerving ſome appearances, at leaſt, and of maintaining ſome affinity to thoſe Governments which, notwithſtanding its former hoſtility, it not only finds itſelf compelled to recognize, but which it alſo affects to imitate. But it muſt occur to every one, that the caſe was very different at the time of the conferences at Liſle; and to this difference is owing whatever degree of momentary ſtability (if the expreſſion may be allowed) the preſent Peace can be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs. Still, however, at the time of thoſe conferences neceſſity might impel Miniſters to negociate, for otherwiſe they might not have been able to obtain ſupplies. And that neceſſity was rendered ſtill more urgent by domeſtic circumſtances of a moſt embarraſſing and alarming nature, which tended exceedingly to cramp the energies of Government, and to depreſs the ſpirit of the country *.

But it cannot be too often repeated, for it ought never to be forgotten, that throughout the War,

* Mention having been made of the laſt Adminiſtration, it would be injuſtice not to acknowledge, that to their virtues and talents, under Providence, this country is indebted for its preſervation during the late moſt arduous conteſt. Had there not exiſted a Pitt, at ſuch time, to hold the helm of State, it is more than probable that not a Throne would have been now remaining in Europe. But juſtice alſo impels the author to add, that in his eſtimation, much of the merit due to the Ex-miniſters for their conduct during the War, is counterbalanced by the part they acted upon the queſtion, which occaſioned their reſignation. Their conduct on that occaſion ſeems to him to prove, that the greateſt errors are thoſe of the greateſt men.

nothing

nothing has contributed more to cramp the energies of Government, and to depreſs the ſpirit of the country, than the perverſe arts and wicked machinations of that party, which has laboured inceſſantly to aggravate all the difficulties, foreign and domeſtic, with which we have had to contend, and to fruſtrate all the exertions which we have made in our own defence, as well as in that of all Europe. It is that party which has proved itſelf the moſt uſeful ally of the French Revolution; which has afforded the moſt effectual aſſiſtance to the French Republic, while ſhe was ſubverting State after State, deſtroying the Balance of Power, and attacking the very foundations of all legitimate Authority.

But not content with inflicting ſuch dreadful injuries on their country, and on mankind, ſome of the members of this party have the additional profligacy to make a boaſt of what they have done. On the very day which brought a ratification, on the part of the French Government, of the Preliminaries of Peace, a conſiderable number of theſe gentlemen, together with a multitude of their deluded followers, happened, (as it was expreſſed by the opening Counſel on the occaſion,) by a "coincidence extremely ſingular," to meet at one of thoſe political tavern dinners, where conviviality is made a ſtimulus to diſaffection—where wine ſerves only to inflame diſloyalty—where toaſts are converted into a vehicle of ſedition—and where the powers of harmony are called forth in the cauſe of diſcord, by

thoſe hireling ſingers, who one day invoke the Divine favour on the head of their King, and the next ſtrain their venal throats, in chaunting the triumphs of his bittereſt enemies*. On this occaſion, the leader ofthe party, in a long ſpeech, declared his opinion, that the arrival of the Preliminaries was an event which would afford every rational member of ſociety, every thinking inhabitant of Europe, an unfeigned cauſe of rejoicing. Condeſcending to particularize the conſiderations, in reſpect of which the Peace afforded him ſo much ſatisfaction, he ſtated, as one of its principal recommendations, that it had failed to attain any of the objects of the War. "We have made Peace," he is reported to have ſaid, "without gaining one of the objects of the War, and I like the Peace the better on that account." The principal of thoſe objects, and that, of courſe, at the failure of which he moſt rejoiced, he then ſtated to be the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon. It is, as has been already ſhewn, a moſt groſs miſrepreſentation, to deſcribe this as one of the objects of the War. If, indeed, that object had been really purſued, there is every reaſon to think that it would have been attained, and that the Honourable Gentleman, inſtead of rejoicing at its failure, would long ere now have deplored its accompliſhment, in

* The reader will naturally feel ſome diſguſt on being introduced to a ſcene ſo much below the dignity of the preſent ſubject. But to follow faction into its haunts, in order to expoſe its artifices to the face of day, is a duty which, however painful, muſt not be neglected at a time like the preſent.

ſpite of all the happy conſequences which it would neceſſarily have produced. Without attempting preciſely to deſcribe thoſe conſequences, it is impoſſible to deny, that they would have been infinitely more favourable to the balance of Power, to the ſtability of Peace, to the independence of Europe, and to the ſecurity of the Britiſh Throne, than the failure at which Mr. Fox ſo much rejoices. That Gentleman, therefore, by avowing his joy on the occaſion, declares himſelf an enemy to the balance of Power, to the ſtability of Peace, to the independence of Europe, and to the ſecurity of the Britiſh Throne.

But by what ſentiment can Mr. Fox be impelled, at the expenſe of the above high and important intereſts, to rejoice that, at the termination of the War, France is a nominal Republic, under the Government of a Firſt Conſul, rather than a Monarchy, under that of a Bourbon. He aſſures us, that it is his attachment to liberty, and his abhorrence of deſpotiſm. Theſe are, indeed, the ſentiments to which he profeſſes to refer the whole of his political conduct. The occaſion is peculiarly well calculated to aſcertain the ſincerity of theſe profeſſions in his mouth; at leaſt it furniſhes an indubitable teſt of the real nature of that liberty which he adores, and of that deſpotiſm, which is ſo much the object of his abhorrence.

Whatever notions Engliſhmen may have formed of the deſpotiſm of the Bourbons—nay, admitting, for the ſake of argument, the juſtice of Mr. Fox's deſcription,

deſcription, (prepoſterouſly falſe as it is) of the ancient government of France—which he is ſtated to repreſent as *the worſt of all deſpotic Monarchies with which the people of any country were ever afflicted*; ſtill it is notorious to every one, who takes even a tranſient ſurvey of the preſent ſtate of France, that the Government of Buonaparte is, beyond all compariſon, more deſpotic than that of any Bourbon who ever ſat on the Throne. If deſpotiſm conſiſt, according to all received notions of it, in the abſence of reſtraint to controul the will of the governing Power, there never, ſince the creation of the world, exiſted ſo abſolute a deſpotiſm as that which Buonaparte now exerciſes. He himſelf concurred in framing the ſyſtem according to which he governs; and he took care to exclude every kind of check which could poſſibly impede his will, or limit his authority. Numerous and almoſt inſuperable were the reſtraints, Religious, Moral, and Political, upon the power of the Bourbons, even in the worſt of times—but France at length beholds the moment in which all power is veſted in the hands of a ſingle individual, of foreign birth, and to whom no one dares to ſay, what doeſt thou? It is not, therefore, deſpotiſm which Mr. Fox abhors, nor liberty which he adores; for he rejoices at the moſt exorbitant increaſe of the former, and at the utter extinction of the latter. While his boaſted attachment to liberty is a mere pretext, he only diſlikes deſpotic power (if the term may be then properly applied) when it is derived from ancient deſcent, when it is accompanied

panied with hereditary rights, when it is regulated and controuled by eſtabliſhed laws, by immemorial uſages, and by councils, tribunals, and forms, known to the remoteſt antiquity. But there are other modes of deſpotiſm to which, though incomparably more rigid, it ſeems he has no objection. The moſt arbitrary Power, that can be exerciſed by man over his fellow creatures, does not diſpleaſe him, provided it be preceded and brought about by inſurrection and revolution—provided it be founded in the ruins of an ancient Throne, drenched by the blood of the moſt virtuous King that ever ſat upon it —provided it be aſſumed and exércíſed in the name of the people, and with the ſymbols of republicaniſm; although, in point of fact, the name of the people be only borrowed, in order to deprive them with more facility of every kind of influence—and, although the empty title of a Republic be all that is to be found of that form of Government. Such is the deſpotiſm which a modern whig approves in others; and which, it is fair to infer, he would be glad to exerciſe himſelf *.

But

* On the late debate reſpecting the Preliminaries of Peace, Mr. Fox urged a topic which ought not to paſs unnoticed. It relates to the queſtion of aggreſſion. Mr. Fox is ſtated to have obſerved, that *it was a War of aggreſſion on the part of this country, becauſe Miniſters took no ſteps to procure reparation or diſavowal for any of the acts of which they complained.* The *fact* is not here accurately ſtated; for Lord Grenville, in his correſpondence with M. Chauvelin, very explicitly demanded reparation for the acts of which he complained, on the part of the King his maſter.

But

But is it true, as Mr. Fox exultingly aſſerts, that we have gained none of the objects of the War? Thank Heaven! we have gained objects of ineſtimable value. Though we have not reſtored the Balance of Power; though we have not maintained the independence of Europe; we have completely repelled a moſt unjuſt attack which was made upon us, with a view to our utter deſtruction. We have preſerved the Britiſh Monarchy, the overthrow of which was the immediate object of the enemy, in commencing the War. We have maintained the integrity of the Britiſh Empire—and even enlarged it with two very valuable poſſeſſions, which conduce both to its ſecurity and its proſperity. We have raiſed, to an unexampled pitch of glory, the reputation of our arms by ſea and land, by the very *laſt operation* of the War—(a circumſtance of peculiar importance). We have wreſted from the legions of France, till then deemed invincible, their boaſted laurels; and have thus acquired a confidence in our military proweſs, and thereby conſiderably augmented

But if he had not done ſo, Mr. Fox's reaſoning is fallacious, and unworthy of a ſtateſman. For the omiſſion of an injured country to demand reparation, can only make her the aggreſſor in caſe ſhe declares War without making ſuch a demand: a ſtep which this country did not take, *for the War was declared by France*. But who till now ever heard it maintained, that a party who receives an injury, and, in addition thereto, is alſo attacked in form, becomes the aggreſſor, by having ſubmitted quietly to his wrongs, and neglected to make a complaint or demand of reparation?

our real ſtrength. We have maintained our national character amid numberleſs difficulties and diſcouragements—preſerved inviolate our faith to our allies—and, at the laſt moment, we have provided for the intereſts of all of them, in the beſt manner we were able, and for thoſe of ſome greatly beyond the extent of any claims they had upon us*. And, finally,

* It has been repeatedly urged, that the Porte is indebted to our arms, and not to our councils, for the integrity of her dominions. Of her obligations to our arms, it is impoſſible to ſpeak too highly—but they could do no more than put her in poſſeſſion of that part of her territories which the enemy had ſeized; they could not prevent the return of that enemy to thoſe territories, after their departure. This, then, was the object of the guarantee; which, moreover, extends to the *whole* of the Ottoman Empire. And though no great degree of value can be ſet upon the guarantee of a Government like that of France, yet it was the beſt ſecurity that could be procured; and, at all events, it has the effect of rendering an invaſion of the Turkiſh territories, in *any* part, a breach of treaty, and a direct violation of faith with this country. The ſame obſervation may be made reſpecting the guarantee in favour of Naples. It renders another invaſion of that country a national queſtion between England and France; and, therefore, the obſervation that we have done nothing to prevent the latter from again marching her armies into the Neapolitan State "in three days," after their departure from it, is not juſt. With regard to the Prince of Orange it ſhould be remembered, that the former guarantee which this country made in his favour, and which was a joint guarantee of Great Britain and Pruſſia, related to his character as Stadtholder of the United Provinces. We have done every thing in our power to perform our engagements in this reſpect; and being able to do no more, it is a recommendation

finally, we have ſtemmed the torrent of revolutionary and infidel principles, until their deſtructive nature has been made manifeſt, to the whole world, by the moſt dreadful example of carnage and deſolation, recorded in hiſtory; until experience has furniſhed mankind with the moſt complete and awful demonſtration, that an attempt to exerciſe the pretended right to change and to chooſe their Government, tends only to render them the ſport of the moſt horrible anarchy, and of the moſt unqualified

dation of the Preliminary Articles, that they do not afford any ſanction to that ſyſtem of ſpoliation and robbery, which is now carrying on in Germany under the pretext of affording indemnities to diſpoſſeſſed Princes, by ſtipulating for ſo unjuſt a compenſation in favour of the above Prince.

But the Preliminary Articles, in another reſpect, exhibit an appearance of a moſt humiliating nature. Purporting to be framed ſolely by his Britannic Majeſty and the French Republic, we ſeem to accept the Dominions, which we have taken from Spain and Holland, at the hands of France. The value of the ceſſion of Ceylon and Trinidad is hereby, it muſt be acknowledged, greatly diminiſhed. For though the vaſſalage of Spain and Holland was, before, but too notorious, yet, does it not reflect diſgrace, as well as imply danger to this country, to recognize the Sovereignty of France over thoſe States, and her right to diſpoſe of their territories? Surely a ſaving clauſe might have been introduced into the Preliminary Treaty, by which appearances, at leaſt, might have been ſaved, and the agreement have been made ſubject to the Ratification of the nominal Governments of the two pretended Allies of France. It is to be hoped, that this omiſſion will be compenſated, as far as poſſible, at Amiens; and that nothing will be omitted to render the Convention at that place, in form at leaſt, if not in ſubſtance, a GENERAL CONGRESS of all the Powers of Europe.

 deſpotiſm;

deſpotiſm; until revolutionary, impious, and atheiſtical France, in order to obtain a momentary repoſe under an unqualified deſpotiſm, has been compelled to acknowledge, that Religion, and, indeed, a national Church, are eſſential to the peace of ſociety *; and until the Britiſh Conſtitution, piercing thoſe black and portentous clouds of error and fanaticiſm which, for a time, hung over it, has again ſhone out in its native ſplendour—nay, with a luſtre, heightened by the obſcurity out of which it has emerged. Such are the objects which we have gained by the War; and though they may be of no value in the eyes of the Whig Club, yet, in the eſtimation of the Britiſh people, they compenſate all the treaſures, and they immortalize all the blood, which have been expended in their attainment.

But Heaven forbid, that a juſt ſenſe of the importance of what we have attained, ſhould make us forget what we have failed to accompliſh; that the high ſatisfaction which a compariſon of our ſtate with that of other nations cannot fail to excite, ſhould induce us to overlook the dangers which we ſhare in common with the ſhattered remains of the civilized world; that, in ſhort, we ſhould be inſenſible of the real nature of our ſituation, which is

* Although the Roman See be, at this time, but an inſtrument in the hands of Buonaparte, (a truth which is, indeed, virtually admitted by the Holy Father, in his letter to the French Biſhops), yet it is no ſmall triumph which Religion has obtained, by the acknowledgment of a people lately attempting to be atheiſts, that ſociety cannot exiſt without it.

calculated

calculated to raiſe in our breaſts a tempeſt of conflicting paſſions—to fill us alternately with joy and grief—with hope and deſpair. Every mind which is endued at once with ſenſibility and comprehenſion, muſt, at this time, experience, in turn, theſe oppoſite emotions. Thinking of what we have preſerved, we have indeed cauſe for exultation.—But we are plunged again into deſpondency when we come to reflect that, though we have preſerved every thing, yet nothing have we been able to ſecure.—Nay, that our deareſt intereſts, which we have ſo gallantly and ſo ſucceſsfully defended, are ſtill expoſed to dangers, greater, for aught we know, and as we have ſome reaſon to fear, than thoſe which they have hitherto eſcaped. Theſe are conſiderations which ſurely muſt make the ſtouteſt hearts to tremble, and fill the firmeſt minds with apprehenſion and anxiety.

To the *political* dangers to which this country is expoſed by the reſtleſs ſpirit, the overweening and inſatiable ambition, and the gigantic aggrandizement of France (to ſay nothing of her revolutionary ſtate) and by the reduced, disjointed, and ſpiritleſs condition of the reſt of the European Continent, no man can pretend to be inſenſible, without abſolutely denying that paſt ages had any juſt pretenſions to ſagacity—without ſtamping with abſurdity thoſe maxims, by the operation of which Great Britain became the firſt of Nations—and without conſigning to contempt the memories of a Burleigh, a Temple, and a Chatham. Thoſe dangers, indeed, are ſo

palpable, and a ſenſe of them is ſo much favoured by our inveterate habits of feeling, and by long experience, that they produce, in every honeſt mind, a conviction of the indiſpenſable neceſſity of maintaining our naval and military eſtabliſhments upon a footing, which utterly repels the ſuppoſition of ſtable and ſecure Peace. But we are alſo expoſed to dangers infinitely more formidable than any *political* dangers whatever, though they ſeem no longer to excite, at leaſt in many minds, any ſerious alarm—the dangers of Jacobiniſm.—Theſe dangers, not being objects of ſenſe, like the over-grown power of a malignant and inſatiable foe, are liable to be forgotten when they are not actually impending juſt over our heads. Thus when the ſtorm has ceaſed to rage, and is ſucceeded by a ſerene atmoſphere, and a cloudleſs ſky, the mariner thinks no longer of the perils which, perhaps, a little before he thought it impoſſible to eſcape. But having for ten years ſeen the direful effects of the hurricane which has ſhaken all ſociety to its foundations—having witneſſed its ravages on every ſide—having trembled leſt it ſhould overthrow our dwellings and make us victims to its fury—would it not be madneſs to confide in the momentary calm, which lulls our ſenſes and invites us to repoſe, or to neglect the precautions which would be neceſſary for our ſafety, ſhould the tempeſt again burſt forth and threaten us with inſtant deſtruction? On this ſubject, however, the prevailing opinion ſeems to be, that all danger is over—that confidence ſhould take place of alarm—

that,

that, in ſhort, Jacobiniſm is no longer formidable. It is worth while to conſider, that if we yield to this opinion, and it happen to prove erroneous, which, whatever apparent grounds there may be for its adoption, is certainly more than poſſible, the conſequences muſt inevitably be fatal. It behoves us, therefore, to take care that if, in ſuch a caſe, we err, it may be on the ſide of ſafety. On all occaſions too much caution is better than too little, and more eſpecially when exiſtence is at ſtake. If it be a ſage rule never to deſpiſe an enemy, how careful ſhould we be not to forget this rule, when the enemy is—Jacobiniſm.

But are there any ſolid grounds for the opinion, or even for the hope, that Jacobiniſm has ceaſed to be dangerous? Does the monſter lie dead at our feet; or, pierced by our weapons, is he faint, gaſping, and ready to expire? If ſo, where are his wounds? Certainly they are not viſible. No blood ſeems to flow from them. His jaws are, indeed, diſtained with gore—but it is from the vitals of his victims. He is not, it is true, at this moment openly prowling, but he ſtands, with glaring eyes, and undiminiſhed fury, near the mouth of his den, ready to ſpring upon the firſt prey that may, unguardedly, come within his reach.

Whence then that ſecurity in which many perſons, who have been duly ſenſible of paſt dangers, ſeem diſpoſed to indulge? Does it proceed from a confidence in the ſalutary effects, produced in the human mind, by an experience of the miſchiefs of

Jacobiniſm? It is true, this horrid ſyſtem has, in conſequence of its ſanguinary atrocities, loſt thouſands of its once deluded adherents. If it were not ſo, we ſhould have no adequate means of defence. But this conſideration, though of a moſt encouraging nature, is very far from authorizing confidence or ſupineneſs. For though multitudes, whoſe underſtandings were at firſt miſled by ſpecious and deluſive theories, have been induced by obſervation and reflection to quit the paths of error, yet thoſe (and their number is indiſputably very conſiderable), whoſe *hearts* have received the deadly venom, are incurable. The wiſeſt inſtruction, the moſt awful warnings, nay, all the leſſons of dear-bought experience, are thrown away upon them. Their principles are utterly vitiated. The taint of Jacobiniſm is indelible.

Every Country in Europe is thronged with perſons who are infected with this dreadful peſtilence, and particularly thoſe countries, where actual and direful experience has not checked the progreſs of the contagion. The populace, who never reaſon, are ſo far corrupted, as to be ready to lend themſelves, for any purpoſes, as the willing tools of Jacobin incendiaries. This was lately but too evident in London, where an Engliſh Mob did ſuch violence to its national character, as to draw the carriage of a Frenchman—not, as was pretended, becauſe he was the herald of Peace —that other Frenchmen had been, in former times, without having their carriages harneſſed by Engliſhmen—but becauſe he was the herald of Buonaparte,

whoſe

whoſe name they loudly vociferated—becauſe he was the agent of ſucceſsful rebellion—becauſe he was thought to confirm the final diſſolution of the French Monarchy—and, perhaps, becauſe he was thought to announce the diſſolution of the Britiſh Monarchy. There is the more reaſon for ſo unpleaſant a conſtruction, as, ſoon afterwards, the exiſting head of that Monarchy, notwithſtanding the Peace which had been brought about by the perſevering endeavours of *his* Miniſters, was received by the ſame mob in ſullen ſilence!

It is not meant to be here inſinuated, that every one who co-operates with the Jacobins is himſelf a Jacobin. Many are ſtimulated to ſuch co-operation by factious motives; many by diſaffection, proceeding from a partial cauſe, as perſonal diſappointment—or ſome imaginary grievance, like the Teſt Laws, which, though directed only to the ſafety of the National Church, and though perfectly compatible with the moſt complete toleration, are converted into an intolerable hardſhip by thoſe who view that Church with an unfriendly eye. Perſons of the above various deſcriptions unite with the Jacobins only to a certain extent, and for particular purpoſes. But they are far from purpoſing to go all lengths with theſe anarchiſts, whoſe complete ſucceſs they deprecate. They intend to *get out at Hounſlow*. While, however, they propoſe to make Jacobiniſm their inſtrument, they are, in fact, *its* dupes; and ſhould the ſluice gates, which they contribute

tribute their endeavours to force, be thrown open, they will, like every thing elſe, be carried away by the torrent of deſtruction—which will then be let looſe.

It may poſſibly be aſked, what after all, is the nature of Jacobiniſm, and what are its objects? For notwithſtanding the dreadful experience which mankind have had of its operation and effects, ſome perſons ſeem quite in the dark reſpecting it, and ſome are ſo ſceptical as to doubt of its reality. To deſcribe it fully would be a moſt voluminous taſk.—But a ſufficient notion will be formed of it, if it be conſidered as a conſpiracy againſt all Religion, all Monarchy, all Ariſtocracy, all Laws, nay, againſt all Government *—againſt property—in ſhort, againſt ſocial order, and every thing by which it is conſtituted or maintained.

The votaries of Jacobiniſm being ſo numerous, and the aſſiſtance they receive ſo conſiderable, can it be ſaid that any events have happened to diſcourage their hopes of ſucceſs, or to deter them from purſuing their deſperate project—the complete deſtruction of all eſtabliſhed Government? Is their aſtoniſhing ſucceſs in overthrowing, in ten years, half the Governments of Europe, calculated to have ſuch an effect? Are they likely to be diſheartened by the trials of their ſtrength, which they have already been able to make, or by the degree of reſiſt-

* Thomas Paine, one of the firſt profeſſors of Jacobiniſm, laboured, in his "Rights of Man," to ſhew that ſociety could exiſt without Government.

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ance which has been oppoſed to them? No, certainly; every thing, as yet, tends only to embolden them to go on, and to inſpire them with the moſt confident hopes of complete ſucceſs. But Jacobiniſm, it is ſaid, is extinguiſhed in France. What, in its very focus and centre? This is, indeed, moſt conſolatory. It is miraculous. Is there, however, any evidence of ſo great an event, at all adequate to the eſtabliſhment of a miracle? Have the French Jacobins been converted at the grave of that ſaint-like King whom they murdered, and whoſe Throne they have not only laid, but kept, in ruins? Have their adamantine hearts been ſoftened by the apoſtleſhip of Buonaparte? They are, it is true, at this moment in a ſtate of quietude. But they are not the leſs dreadful on that account. The tyger is not leaſt dangerous when he lies in ambuſh. The Chief Conſul is too wiſe to truſt to their converſion; he is very far from thinking that Jacobiniſm is extinguiſhed; he is fully aware that if Jacobins were ſuſceptible of gratitude, their ſenſe—even of his former ſervices—would be loſt in their reſentment againſt him for aſſuming the ſupreme authority—which, in whatever hands it may reſide, is the conſtant object of their implacable hate. He well knows that if he were for a ſingle inſtant to relax his vigilance, he would become their victim. He remembers the *Infernale*, and, perhaps, many other contrivances to diſpoſe of him, *a la Jacobin*, which, very wiſely, he has omitted to communicate to the world. If, however, their ingenuity or deſperation ſhould, at

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any time, even at the diſtance of years, get the better of his caution, *chaos will come again*; and we ſhall be convinced that Jacobiniſm is not extinguiſhed in France *.

Mean while theſe peſts of ſociety, theſe ſcourges of the human race, will be ſedulouſly employed in improving their advantages in the reſt of the world, and in ſeizing every opportunity of promoting the accompliſhment of their ſchemes. It will ſcarcely be contended that the general Peace which has taken place, will either diſcourage their activity, or impede their exertions. They can work quite as well in the calm of Peace, as in the ſtorm of War. Nay, Peace is advantageous to them, as it favours that free communication between the Jacobins of different countries to which, in ſpite of every precaution, Peace will be favourable; and againſt which the Emperor of Ruſſia has been ſo wiſe as to pro-

* The malignant principle of Jacobiniſm is capable, for a very conſiderable time, of lying dormant, ſo that thoſe who are not acquainted with its remarkable qualities, may ſuppoſe it to be dead. But upon the firſt favourable change in the political atmoſphere it revives, and in an inſtant reſumes all its activity. It juſtly reſembles, in this reſpect, a ſpecies of the wheel-animalculum, to which the ſpirit of Revolution in France has been compared by a Reverend and able writer, and which is aptly denominated, "chaotic." This animalculum, it is ſaid, "when dried, will remain in duſt for long periods of time, but revives, in full vigour, by barely putting a ſingle drop of water upon it, and inſtantly reſumes its revolutionary movements." See a letter to ———, by the Rev. John Brand, from which the above extract is quoted in "Reflections on the Political and Moral State of Society at the cloſe of the eighteenth century." p. 67.

vide

vide in his Treaty with the Firſt Conſul—an example which, though not very conſiſtent with the ſuppoſition that Jacobiniſm is extinct in France, will, it is to be hoped, have its due effect at Amiens. For it muſt not be forgotten, that Jacobins are perfect Coſmopolites. They are of no country—they are *citizens* of the world—their object is the overthrow of all eſtabliſhments, Religious and Civil—and with a view to that object, they are in cloſe concert and combination all over the world. Wherever born, or whatever their language, they have an inſtinct peculiar to themſelves, which enables them to communicate and to co-operate. Peace is, therefore, an advantage to them. It is at once their ſeed time and their harveſt. It enables them, with leſs difficulty, to diſſeminate their principles, and to gather in their fruits. It frees them from military interruptions: for though they have found their way among the Auſtrian troops, a fact which caſts a ſtrong light upon the hiſtory of the War, yet they have been repeatedly diſheartened by the victories of the Archduke Charles; and the Britiſh and Ruſſian armies have often filled them with deſpair. But Peace will relieve them of ſuch embarraſſments—and ſuch a Peace as the preſent may well animate their hopes, ſince, by confirming their paſt, it encourages them to look forward to future, triumphs.

In this country the Jacobins have had their full ſhare of the general joy which has been excited by the Peace, nay, they have been diſtinguiſhed by the fervency of their exultation at that event. Indeed, the

the ſatisfaction of the diſaffected, on this occaſion, ſeems to have been proportionate to their degree of diſaffection. Surely there muſt be much danger in a Peace, which produces ſuch effects on ſuch men. Surely much miſchief muſt *lurk*, at leaſt, under an event, which raiſes a tempeſt of joy in the breaſt of a Jacobin—which can even inſpire the polluted Muſe of a Jacobin Proſtitute. It is true, loyal men in the goodneſs of their hearts, have alſo rejoiced, and *that* in a manner which has been aptly deſcribed by the term *delirium*. But others, who unite loyalty with circumſpection, have found it impoſſible to partake of the general hilarity, or, at moſt, they have rejoiced *with fear and trembling*. At all events, when the ſame ſentiment animates the breaſt of men of oppoſite deſcriptions, it becomes a curious and an intereſting queſtion, whoſe feelings are moſt likely to be correct with regard to their reſpective views of the ſubject. And here, it is juſtly to be feared, that the Jacobin has the advantage; for the matter relates principally to himſelf, and what he may be able to accompliſh; and he may be fairly preſumed to be the beſt judge of his own reſources.

The bounty of Providence, by crowning the year with plenty, has, it may be hoped, deprived the Jacobins of one of their grand reſources for the excitement of diſaffection. But the ingenuity of theſe diſturbers of mankind can never be at a loſs for pretexts, to fill the credulous and unreflecting mind with diſcontent. The imperfections, inſeparable from the moſt flouriſhing ſtate of which human ſociety

ciety is capable, would abundantly ſupply them with ſuch pretexts. What advantages, then, may they not be expected to derive, for the above purpoſe, from the inevitable conſequences of a moſt expenſive War, and even from a Peace, which, to ſay the beſt of it, does not bring with it that ordinary ſecurity that Peace has never, till now, failed to produce. It deſerves alſo to be taken into conſideration, that Jacobiniſm is a perfect Proteus, capable of aſſuming any form whatever, in order to elude the vigilance of his enemies, or to accommodate himſelf to thoſe whom he can hope, in any reſpect, to render inſtrumental to his grand projects of deſtruction. This infernal fiend can appear as an angel of light; he can wear the maſk of REFORM; he can borrow the ſacred garb of Religion, the more eaſily and effectually to gratify his inveterate hoſtility *againſt* Religion, which he juſtly conſiders as his grand obſtacle to the deſtruction of Government. He does actually, at this moment, appear in that garb; under cover of which, he is endeavouring to ſow the ſeeds of Religious diſſention, and to fill the hearts of all who take the benefit of that complete toleration which *all* enjoy in this country, with inveterate hoſtility to the Eſtabliſhed Church. This is one of the deepeſt projects which he has yet formed. For he well knows, that if he could once effect the overthrow of the National Church, he would not only be ſure to triumph over the other parts of the Conſtitution, but he would alſo hope to ſucceed againſt Chriſtianity itſelf; which, from the days of

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his infancy, when under the tuition of Voltaire, to his preſent ſtate of complete maturity, has been the grand object of his deteſtation. He is fully aware, that the fall of the Church of England would enable him to prevail over the various ſects, which flouriſh under the protection that it affords; and that he would then be able to erect his own ferocious and atheiſtical ſtandard, from which all ſects of Religion would flee to the mournful ſhade of privacy and concealment. He alſo learns, from the page of hiſtory, that a ſmall ſpark of ſchiſm is capable of being blown into a flame, which nothing can reſiſt; and that the convulſions, which once overturned both Church and State, in this country, originated in the animoſity of a few ſeparatiſts, who, during the ſanguinary perſecutions of Queen Mary, imbibed, in foreign countries, a ſpirit of hoſtility to Epiſcopacy, and who, though then deſtitute of thoſe advantages of full toleration which are now enjoyed, found means, by degrees, to diffuſe that ſpirit ſo extenſively, that, aided by the circumſtances of the times, it was, at length, able to lay in ruins the Epiſcopacy, the Peerage, and the Throne*. If ſo,

* It ought to be remembered, that the reformed Church of England—which was formerly purſued with ſuch rancorous hoſtility, until its overthrow was accompliſhed, and the ruin of which is again ſought by great multitudes—was, in the firſt inſtance, conſidered as ſo excellent an inſtitution by Calvin and Beza, that they deemed it impoſſible for any perſons to be ſo *mad* as to be diſſatisfied with it. The former, in an epiſtle to Cardinal Sadolet, (as Mr. Jones obſerves in his Eſſay on the Church)

ſo, what advantages muſt Jacobiniſm derive at this moment, from the uninterrupted and moſt alarm-

Church) ſaid of thoſe who ſhould reject ſuch an hierarchy, that he ſhould think them *nullo non anathemate dignos*; i. e. "that no curſe could be too bad for them." Beza (continues Mr. Jones) would not believe, that any could regret the order of Biſhops in a reformed Church. "*If there be ſuch*," ſaid he, "God forbid, that any man in his wits ſhould aſſent to the madneſs of thoſe men." And the ſame writer, alluding to the Hierarchy of England and her Biſhops, ſays, "let her enjoy that ſingular bleſſing of God, which I wiſh may be perpetual to her *." To this favourable teſtimony the Church of England is, at leaſt, as well entitled now, as ſhe was at firſt. That, in practice, ſhe is ſubject to abuſes, is the neceſſary conſequence of her being an inſtitution adminiſtered by men. And ſhe muſt, moreover, for the ſame reaſon, be expected to partake of the extraordinary corruption of the age. This, however, affords no excuſe to thoſe of her members who contribute to her abuſes. Of thoſe members it may moſt truly be ſaid, "Woe be to them by whom the offence cometh." The higheſt reſponſibility that can be undertaken by man, is that of a Chriſtian Divine; for he has to account, as far as his opportunities and his influence extend, for the ſouls of others, as well as his own; and never was that reſponſibility ſo great as at the preſent moment. Upon the extraordinary piety and diligence of thoſe Divines, upon their cloſe and laborious attention, in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, to their important functions, depend, perhaps, the beſt hopes of this country, to eſcape the dangers of the preſent alarming criſis. If, at ſuch a time, they prove themſelves worthy of their vocation, they will render the greateſt poſſible ſervice to the Church, and to the World. On the contrary, if at ſuch a time they contribute, by their conduct, to expoſe the Church to which they belong to the ſhafts of its enemies, and to injure the cauſe of Chriſtianity, their crime is, perhaps, the greateſt of which it is poſſible for human nature to be guilty; and their puniſhment will be proportionably ſevere.

* See Jones's Works, Vol. IV. p. 496.

ing growth of ſchiſm, to convert the invaluable privilege of toleration, which ſhould excite ſentiments of gratitude, and even attachment, into a ſource of the moſt malignant diſaffection; and to attack, under cover of that unfortunate queſtion which overſpread, with the blackeſt clouds, the dawn of the late auſpicious Union—the ancient barriers of the Church, which the united wiſdom of ages has deemed eſſential to its ſafety. Nothing that has been here ſaid is in the leaſt unfavourable to that mild ſpirit of toleration, which is characteriſtic of the Church of England, and by which, neither of its religious opponents, Romaniſt or Proteſtant, was animated, when in power. The exerciſe of every principle, and, indeed, of every right, ſhould be ſo regulated, as to prevent it from being hurtful to other privileges and other rights. It, therefore, behoves the Conſtitutional Guardian of the Engliſh Church, the Legiſlature, to protect it againſt the dangers to which it is now expoſed, from the abuſe of religious toleration. The worſt conſequences are at this moment to be apprehended from the unlimited permiſſion which is granted to all perſons, without any enquiry into their moalrs or qualifications, and without the ſmalleſt degree of reſponſibility, to aſſume the important character of religious teachers*. The

* Any perſon may obtain, as a matter of courſe, a licenſe to preach, upon the payment of ſixpence. And great numbers obtain ſuch licence, who are not even capable of writing their names.

effect

effect of this permiſſion has been, already, to pervert and fanaticize the minds of great numbers in the lower claſſes, who are always moſt ſtrongly attracted by the greateſt noiſe, whether it proceed from the pulpit of the field preacher, or from the ſtage of the demagogue. Many are the thouſands in this country who have been thus prepared to become the blind and ſervile tools of Jacobiniſm. It would be prepoſterous to ſay, that the principle of toleration requires a connivance at abuſes which are dangerous, in the higheſt degree, to the power by which that principle is protected, and, of courſe, ultimately, to itſelf.

To counterbalance the tumultuous joy, which, in the firſt moments, was manifeſted by the Engliſh Jacobins on account of the Peace, it has been urged, that the ſame event fills the United Iriſhmen with dejection. And well it may: for the latter are thereby deprived of all hope of again ſeeing a body of French troops in Ireland; an event which would, at once, have rekindled the flame of rebellion from one end of that part of the United Kingdom to the other—and the prevention of which it is certainly juſt to put into the ſcale, in favour of the pacification which has taken place. It cannot be doubted, that this conſideration abates, in ſome degree, the joy of the Jacobins in this country. But notwithſtanding this partial diſappointment, they have ſubſtantial cauſe for thoſe raptures, which it might have been prudent to conceal, but which were too ſtrong to be ſuppreſſed. For, beſides the *gene-*

ral advantages that their cauſe may be expected to derive from a termination of a war, which, if it had been judiciouſly directed, would have been fatal to their hopes, they expect the Peace to be productive of *peculiar* advantages to them in this country, by inducing a neceſſity of inſtantly diſbanding thoſe military aſſociations, which have exceedingly embarraſſed their operations, and of repealing thoſe reſtrictive laws, which have preſerved the Conſtitution againſt their attacks. In a moment of apparent tranquillity, when Jacobiniſm was thought to be ſubdued, thoſe laws were ſuffered to expire. But it was ſoon found that there was no ſafety, except under their protection; and their revival was deemed by Parliament, after a full examination of the effects of their ſuſpenſion, a meaſure of indiſpenſable neceſſity. The effuſions of Jacobin joy, on the unexpected arrival of the Preliminaries, may therefore be, in part, accounted for, by referring them to a confident hope, that the enemies of the Conſtitution would ſoon be able to aſſemble—to machinate—to conſpire—and, when the occaſion ſhould arrive, to reſort to open violence—without danger of interruption from reſtrictive laws or military aſſociations. Is it poſſible to conceive of ſtronger reaſons for the continuance of thoſe laws and thoſe aſſociations, until, by a *real* change of circumſtances, they may be diſcontinued with ſafety?

It is not, however, from volunteer corps, or from the reſtrictive laws, which the peculiar circumſtances

ſtances of the times have rendered neceſſary, that we can derive any adequate defence againſt the dangers by which we are ſtill menaced. Such expedients are of a temporary nature, and they are irkſome even to thoſe, who are moſt anxious to prevent their premature diſcontinuance. Great are the expenſes of various kinds, the ſacrifice of time, the riſk to health, the bodily fatigue, by which the members of the military aſſociations have entitled themſelves to the laſting gratitude of their Country. And every one muſt regret the neceſſity of guarding the Conſtitution, by a partial ſuſpenſion of one of its moſt valuable benefits, the Habeas Corpus Act. Such remedies, however, though ſalutary, though indiſpenſable—from the circumſtances of the times—can only check, but are incapable of curing the malady. Other means are neceſſary to enable us to overcome, and, indeed, to cope with Jacobiniſm. This malignant diſeaſe derives its ſtrength from the moral corruption of ſociety; and it can be effectually reſiſted only by moral amendment. Vice and infidelity prepared the human heart for its reception, and nothing can expel it, but the purifying and invigorating influence of Religion and Virtue. In a profligate nation, it is conſtantly receiving freſh ſupplies of nouriſhment—among a moral people it muſt, if it could come into exiſtence, ſoon languiſh and expire. The extreme depravity of the preſent age, has enabled it, as it were, in an inſtant, to make the moſt dreadful havoc among the human race, and to ſpread deſolation far and wide;

and unleſs, warned by ſo ſhocking an example, mankind inſtantly ſet about the great work of reformation, there is abundant reaſon to fear that what they have already ſuffered, is only a faint ſpecimen of the calamities which are yet in ſtore for them*.

So deplorably corrupt is the preſent ſtate of ſociety, that this country alone ſeems to poſſeſs a ſufficient ſtock of virtue, to enable it to begin the above great and neceſſary work. And yet, with this diſtinction in our favour, how dreadfully alarming is the proſpect before us! The preſſure and ſeclusion of war, and the imminent danger to which every thing we hold dear has, for years, been expoſed, have not been able to check the progreſs of luxury, diſſipation, and vice. What then muſt be the effects of that comparative relief, of that extreme ſatisfaction and hilarity, which, notwithſtanding all our juſt motives for uneaſineſs, have accompanied the return of Peace? What muſt be the conſequence of a renewed intercourſe with a people, whoſe vices have ruined themſelves and half the reſt of Europe, and who are become, beyond all compariſon, more vicious than ever? To judge coolly

* The writer of this having, in his Reflections on the Moral State of Society, at the Cloſe of the 18th Century, endeavoured, pretty much at large, to develope the cauſes which have produced the preſent extremely degenerate State of Society—to delineate, with fidelity, the moſt prominent features of that ſtate—and to ſhew its direct tendency, unleſs ſpeedily corrected by reformation, to promote the general ruin of the Social Word—he conceives it unneceſſary again to expatiate upon theſe moſt important topics.

and impartially from theſe circumſtances (without a due attention to which, it is impoſſible to form a ſober judgment of our condition), our career of vice is likely, in a ſhort time, to precipitate us into the abyſs of ruin.

In whatever light this important ſubject is conſidered, it exhibits a moſt menacing aſpect. Scarcely a ſymptom can be perceived, which is not of the moſt alarming nature. But of all the ſymptoms which are diſcoverable, in regard to our morals, the moſt inauſpicious, perhaps, is the decay of thoſe feelings, which have been hitherto the ornament and the pride of the female ſex. It is not meant here to inſiſt upon the alarming progreſs of adultery, upon the growing numbers and increaſing ſhameleſsneſs of thoſe women who abandon the paths of virtue. A ſtill more unwelcome reflection forces itſelf upon the mind of every one, who contemplates the preſent manners of the faſhionable world, and in relation *to thoſe women*, whoſe character is without a ſpot. No longer do ſuch women, at leaſt in the higher circles, pride themſelves, as they have ever been wont to do, on the diſtinction which ſeparates them from the moſt abandoned of their ſex. Females of ſuperior rank, who give the ton to the poliſhed part of ſociety, and the influence of whoſe example muſt extend, through various gradations, to the humble walks of life, are beginning to lay aſide that dignified reſerve, which formerly kept, at an awful diſtance, all who were not clothed in the fair robe of unſullied reputation. They are become

ſo wonderfully condeſcending as to aſſociate with thoſe, whoſe approaches they would formerly have conſidered as an inſult, and with whom they would have deemed the ſmalleſt communication infamous—nay, even to borrow their garb from the votaries of licentiouſneſs, from whom they have already tranſmitted, to every claſs, faſhions which were framed, and which are evidently calculated, to produce a diſſoluteneſs of manners; for the indecent modes of dreſs—or rather of undreſs—which are now univerſally prevalent among the Britiſh Fair, were invented by the abandoned part of the ſex, with a view to excite ſenſuality and to promote debauchery. Do theſe aſtoniſhing condeſcenſions proceed from that tender and compaſſionate ſympathy with guilt, which has been caught from the German ſchool, and which impels us to conſider vice as an object of compaſſion and indulgence, rather than of horror and deteſtation? or are they the reſult of an opinion, that the principle of female virtue muſt derive ſuch vigour from the circumſtances of the times, and the *preſent* ſtate of the ſocial world, as to ſtand no longer in need of thoſe auxiliaries, which have hitherto been found neceſſary to aſſiſt it in its ſtruggles with paſſion and temptation? or are they produced by that ſanction, which the Legiſlature, by repeatedly refuſing to prohibit adulterous marriages, has ſeemed to give to adultery? In whatever cauſe they originate, they furniſh an indication of a moſt unfavourable nature, and their tendency is pernicious in the higheſt degree. However the ſentiments

of mankind may fluctuate on theſe, as on many other ſubjects, human nature continues unchanged and unchangeable. In its beſt ſtate, (a diſtinction which it is very far from being, at this time, entitled to claim,) it wants every aſſiſtance to confirm its virtue, and to guard it againſt vice. Female chaſtity has ever been, and ever *muſt* be, the main ſource of all the virtues, which conſtitute the ſtrength and the ſecurity of human ſociety. And female modeſty is ordained, by the unalterable conſtitution of nature, to be the guardian of female chaſtity. What was it, but the prudent vigilance of that guardian, which, till lately, prohibited its valuable charge, the virtuous fair, from all communication with the depraved part of their ſex—which inſpired our female anceſtors, and, till lately, the females of our own time, with that conſervative pride of character, that extreme ſenſibility of honour, which made them look with ſcorn upon a woman, who had loſt her purity, and almoſt to conſider her atmoſphere as peſtilential? Much as theſe feelings have, in particular caſes been, made the ſubject of ridicule or of cenſure, they were inexpreſſibly beneficial. They preſerved a conſtant and lively ſenſe of the value of what is moſt valuable in ſociety; and they tended to deter from vice, by rendering it odious and infamous. But to preſerve theſe feelings, it is neceſſary to maintain them in their utmoſt extent. The caſe does not admit of a *ſingle* exception. Honour, eſpecially in women, can admit of no compromiſe with diſhonour;

no

no approaches muſt be allowed; the boundary muſt be conſidered as impaſſable; the line is the rubicon of female virtue. Never could it be more truly ſaid than in relation to this ſubject—

" Vice is a monſter of ſuch frightful mien
" As to be hated needs but to be ſeen;
" Yet ſeen too oft, familiar with its face,
" We firſt endure, then pity, then embrace."

What then have we not to dread from the diſpoſition which is now beginning to diſplay itſelf in the faſhionable world, to diſregard feelings, which, till now, have been cheriſhed by all, who had even a reſpect for female chaſtity? To counteract that diſpoſition, (which, as well as every diſpoſition favourable to immorality, may be expected to derive great ſtrength from our approaching intimacy with degenerate France,) it is neceſſary to raiſe an additional mound about the virtue of the fair ſex—by conſidering the character of thoſe women, who, in defiance of all decency, dare to aſſociate with pollution, as contaminated by the contact. Every care, in ſhort, ſhould be taken, to reſtore the authority of a rule, which has hitherto been conſidered as ſacred—that *the infamy of Vice is the laſt bulwark of Virtue.*

Let not theſe ſubjects be conſidered as the excluſive province of the Divine or Moraliſt; they relate to the deareſt intereſts of ſociety, and call for the ſerious and conſtant attention of the Stateſman, and, indeed, of every one who has a feeling for his county—

a ſolicitude

a ſolicitude for the preſervation of public tranquillity, of ſocial order, nay, of the moſt common rights of perſons and property. He is a wretched politician at all times, and particularly at a time like the preſent, who is not alſo a moraliſt; who does not conſult the intereſts of religion and virtue, in which, alone, the temporal intereſts of mankind can find any permanent or real ſecurity.

In contemplating, in a general view, the actual ſtate of Morals in this Country, nothing is more calculated to excite deſpondency than the conſideration, that we have continued to make great advances in depravity, not only while ſtruggling for our exiſtence, and while our ſituation was, of courſe, the moſt unfavourable to vice, but while we enjoyed advantages peculiarly favourable to moral improvement—While the Britiſh Throne was exhibiting a bright example of piety and virtue; which, though it cannot illumine, ſerves to diſplay, in "darkneſs viſible," the deep and horrible corruption in which the world is plunged. By the tranſcendantly excellent qualities that diſtinguiſh the Great Perſonage who now fills that Throne, he has been enabled to ſtand in the breach, which has been made in the ramparts of civilized Society; and to avert the total deſtruction which has menaced the venerable edifice. But while thoſe qualities have ſhone with ſuch attractive and powerful luſtre—while they have been producing ſuch beneficial effects—we have been making gigantic ſtrides in our vicious career! What would become of us, if we ſhould be ſuddenly deprived

prived of the bleſſing, which we have ſo much abuſed? What would be our fate, if, at a juncture like this, the Throne were to exhibit an example of an oppoſite tendency? Heaven preſerve us from ſuch a misfortune! My attachment to the Britiſh Monarchy, and to the reigning Family, is rooted in my "heart's core." My anxiety for the Britiſh Throne, during the late dangers to which, in common with every other Throne, it has been expoſed, has embittered my choiceſt comforts: and I moſt ſolemnly vow, before Almighty God, to devote myſelf, to the end of my days, to the maintenance of that Throne. With theſe feelings—with this determination—may I not venture to approach the accompliſhed Prince, who is next in the order of Royal Succeſſion, with the words of Truth—ſo ſeldom heard by Princes, though the moſt valuable offering that can be preſented to them—and to aſſure him, that all his *real* friends are apprehenſive of the moſt direful conſequences to himſelf, to his Houſe, and to his Country, unleſs he imitate the bright pattern of Religion and Virtue which is diſplayed by his Illuſtrious Sire.

But all the virtues which can adorn the Throne will not long be of any avail, without a ſuitable co-operation on the part of thoſe, whoſe example, next to that of the Sovereign, has the greateſt influence on the manners of Society. It deſerves the moſt attentive conſideration of the higher ranks, that if they conduce to the depravity of the age, they will ſerve, in the moſt eſſential manner, the cauſe of Jacobiniſm;

cobiniſm; and contribute, by the moſt effectual means, to level with the duſt that venerable column of Ariſtocracy, which is a neceſſary ſupport of the ſocial edifice. The whole of that column, from the broad baſe, which ſtands upon the firm foundation of ſocial reſpect, to the towering capital, which, by its dignified elevation, commands the reverence of all below, depends, not merely for its beauty, but alſo for its ſtrength, upon Religion and Morals; without which, inſtead of being the *Corinthian Pillar* of the ſocial edifice, it would become a weak and tottering pile of deformity. May every one who belongs to this moſt valuable Order, duly reflect upon the importance of his example at ſo awful a criſis, as that which, unleſs a ſpeedy amendment take place, now menaces every Order with ruin, and every individual with wretchedneſs.

The preſent ſtate of the Political world is ſo perpectly novel, as to put it entirely out of our power, though aided by all the experience of paſt times, to form any confident opinion reſpecting the future. As far, indeed, as hiſtory throws any light upon the proſpects before us, it renders them inexpreſſibly horrible. It is impoſſible, however, for human wiſdom, even with all the advantages it can derive from hiſtory, without the utmoſt raſhneſs to decide, whether the black clouds, which are now awfully impending over us, will diſperſe, and give place to a bright ſunſhine of public and general proſperity—or whether they will burſt upon us in a tempeſt, ſtill more terrible than that which has juſt ceaſed to rage. But whichſoever of theſe events ſhall take place,

there

there is abundant reaſon to conlude that nothing, except a reformation of manners, can long avert the overthrow of thoſe eſtabliſhments, in the preſervation of which we are at this inſtant rejoicing, and the fate of which involves the exiſtence of every thing dear to us in this life. For, ſuppoſing the political dangers, which now wear ſo lowering and portentous an aſpect, to be ſoon diſſipated and to paſs away—ſuppoſing the ſanguine hopes, which many ſeem ſo fondly to indulge, to be ſpeedily and fully realized, a ſcene of proſperity may then be expected to open upon us, for which, in our preſent ſtate of manners, we are totally unprepared; and which, unleſs it be preceded by a great degree of moral improvement, will render our vices ſo luxuriant, as ſoon to choke our weak and languiſhing ſhoots of virtue, and to enſure that deſtruction which a coincidence of great proſperity and complete depravity cannot fail to produce. If, on the contrary, the fears, of which no one, who caſts an eye on the preſent ſtate of Europe, can diveſt himſelf, be confirmed—if France be able to conſolidate the gigantic power which ſhe now poſſeſſes, and which, in that caſe, it cannot be doubted, ſhe will direct againſt the ſafety and independence of the reſt of Europe, we ſhall then have difficulties to contend with—which nothing could enable us to overcome but the ſtrength that Virtue alone can beſtow—and which will ſpeedily overwhelm us, unleſs we previouſly deliver ourſelves from the enervating and debilitating dominion of Vice. Should Great Britain, how-

ever,

ever, become a virtuous nation—that is, every fair allowance being made for the imperfections inſeparable from human nature, (which muſt always bear ſome proportion to the extent and proſperity of communities)—ſhould her *characteriſtic* be virtue, ſhe would have nothing to fear from all the Power of France, whatever its aggrandizement may be, could bring againſt her—And ſhe would have reaſon to hope that her example, by holding forth to the admiration of the world, the happy effects of Religion and good Morals, might prove the occaſion of GENERAL REFORMATION.

On this moſt intereſting and important ſubject, *the influence of Virtue on national ſtrength*, the reader ſhall be preſented with ſome extracts from a work of profound wiſdom and great celebrity.*.

" Theſe tendencies of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to *individuals*. But it may require more particularly to be conſidered, that power in a *Society*, by being under the direction of Virtue, naturally increaſes, and has a neceſſary tendency to prevail over oppoſite power, not under the direction of it; in like manner as power, by being under the direction of reaſon, increaſes, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force.

" Now I ſay, virtue in Society has a like tendency to procure ſuperiority and additional power: whether

* See Butler's Analogy.

this

this power be conſidered as the means of ſecurity from oppoſite power, or of obtaining other advantages. And it has this tendency, by rendering public good, an object and end, to every member of the Society; by putting every one upon conſideration and diligence, recollection and ſelf-government, both in order to ſee what is the moſt effectual method, and alſo in order to perform their proper part, for obtaining and preſerving it; by uniting a Society within itſelf, and ſo increaſing its ſtrength; and, which is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and juſtice. For as theſe laſt are principal bonds of union, ſo benevolence or public ſpirit, undirected, unreſtrained by them, is, nobody knows what.

" For, much leſs, very much leſs, power under the direction of virtue, would prevail over much greater not under the direction of it.

" For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in ſome degree, amongſt all who are endued with it, and known to each other; ſo as that by it, a good man cannot but recommend himſelf to the favour and protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole univerſe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can interpoſe in his behalf in any part of his duration.

" But,

" But, cunning and falſe ſelf-intereſt, confederacies in injuſtice—ever ſlight, and accompanied with faction and inteſtine treachery—theſe, on one hand, would be found mere childiſh folly and weakneſs, when ſet in oppoſition againſt wiſdom, public ſpirit, union inviolable, and fidelity, on the other: allowing both a ſufficient length of years to try their force."

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